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The practice of financial public relations is widespread in the field of public 
relations, but there is little research concerning the practice of financial public relations.  
In response to the call for additional research on financial public relations, this paper will 
examine the intersections of financial public relations, issue management, and 
organizational communication.  Specifically, this project will explore how contemporary 
issue management requires companies to maintain their actional and institutional 
legitimacy.   
 Following the Financial Crisis of 2008, major banks such as JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo attempted to rebuild stakeholder and shareholder trust 
in the American financial system.  Financial public relations played a key role in 
rebuilding this trust.  Through a rhetorical analysis of the use of strategic communication 
by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, a number of conclusions can be 
drawn about the practice of issue management and financial public relations.  Specifically, 
this paper found that legitimacy is of importance in post-crisis corporate communication.  
How JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo responded to questions 
ix 
 
raised about their actional and institutional legitimacy impacted their press coverage and 
organizational discourse.  This underscores the importance of careful communication in 
managing shareholder and stakeholder concerns and rebuilding public trust in their 
corporations.  
Keywords: financial public relations; issue management; strategic communication; 
Financial Crisis of 2008; actional legitimacy. 
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Size, we are told, is not a crime.  But size may, at least, become noxious by reason of the 
means through which it was attained or the uses to which it is put.   
-Louis Brandeis, Other People’s Money: And How the Bankers Use It, 1923 
 
In early 2009, JPMorgan Chase launched an advertisement series called “The 
Way Forward.” The bank took out print advertisements in The New York Times, The Wall 
Street Journal, and The Washington Post and launched over 11 television commercials 
centered on this theme (Hobson, 2009).  Using language like, “we’re focusing on The 
Way Forward to help improve the health of our economy,” “we’re reaching out to small 
businesses…lending them more than $10 billion,” and claiming to have prevented 
565,000 foreclosures since 2007, JPMorgan Chase sent a clear message of organizational 
stability, guidance, and success.   
In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, big Wall Street banks like JPMorgan 
Chase were faced with a crisis of legitimation.  During a severe economic downturn 
attributed to poor lending and trading practices (e.g., the trading of mortgage-backed 
securities), the institutional and actional legitimacy of Wall Street banks was questioned.  
Calls for increased regulation were fierce.  Consequently, JPMorgan Chase’s 
advertisement series stressing it is the bank to lead America forward was bold, but 
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important to the revitalization of the organization.  For example, analyst Brad Hintz said 
these ads were important for JPMorgan Chase’s standing with Congress as the bank was 
trying to position itself as the organization keeping middle-class Americans in their 
homes (Hobson, 2009).  With the examination of other public relations activities like 
annual reports, letters to shareholders, and press releases, I explore themes of success, 
stability, and guidance that emerged from JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells 
Fargo’s rhetoric as they tried to recover from the 2008 financial crisis.    
These advertisements were not the only piece in the image restoration activity of 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  The everyday public relations 
activity, such as the issuing of press releases, was also of importance to these banks and 
their stability post-financial crisis.  However, public relations scholarship does not always 
reflect these everyday public relations activities.  For example, crisis management gets 
more play than issue management, perhaps because crisis management is more 
glamorous.  Crisis communication case studies like the BP oil spill, Johnson & Johnson’s 
Tylenol case, and Firestone’s tire fiasco have found their way into the common corpus of 
public relations literature, whereas everyday public relations functions (e.g., pitching 
stories to the media) are not as frequently discussed.  Even topics such as development 
and fundraising, both of which are vital to the success of universities where academics 
work, get almost no mention in the public relations literature despite their importance in 
the practice of public relations at the university level.  When surveying the practice of 
public relations, crisis communication only constitutes a small portion of the day-to-day 
practice of public relations.  In fact, issue management is considerably more common but 
can be overlooked despite Heath and Palenchar’s (2009) findings that 91% of Fortune 
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500 companies had issue management programs, and those programs were oftentimes 
considered extremely important (23.8%) or very important (50.0%) to CEOs and 
organizational leaders.  Issue management can prevent issues from becoming crises, 
thereby negating the potential for any public crisis, and some executives claim they spend 
as much as 50 percent of their time attending to issue management (Gaunt & Ollenburger, 
1995).  However, academic literature does not reflect this trend.  For example, Gaunt and 
Ollenburger (1995) argue the field has not developed rapidly because of the difficulty in 
predicting issues.  In 1990, an “end of first decade progress report” was published to 
measure how the concept of issue management, coined in 1980, was performing in the 
academic literature.  Heath and Cousino (1990) found that more than 240 scholarly and 
professional articles as well as scholarly books and public relations texts discussed issues 
management directly, or featured topics essential to its practice.  However, this required a 
literature search across disciplines such as business, business planning and management, 
public policy, public affairs, and communication, and certainly does not reflect the trend 
that executives spend as much as half their time attending to issue management.   
Financial public relations also struggles with adequate representation in scholarly 
literature.  Current literature that falls under the financial public relations umbrella 
includes research on annual reports (e.g., Camiciotti, 2009; Linsley & Shrives, 2006; 
Gerbner, 1969; Parker, 1982), financial ethics (e.g., Camiciotti, 2011), the dot-com 
bubble (e.g., Goodnight & Green, 2010), and organizational trust and strategic ambiguity 
(e.g., Christensen & Langer, 2009).  This study provides additional research on financial 
public relations through a focus on three financial institutions and their issue management 
after the 2008 financial crisis.  This chapter will provide a brief overview of the financial 
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crisis and how I plan to study responses rhetorically.  The following chapter will more 
fully expand on the relevant literature in financial public relations, issue management, 
and legitimacy.  The third chapter will introduce the proposed research methodology for 
conducting this study.  The fourth chapter will analyze the data and highlight the themes 
that emerge from each bank’s discourse.  The fifth chapter will provide some conclusions 
and future directions for research.   
 
1.1 The Financial Crisis of 2008 
News outlets, financial analysts, and economists regularly refer to the financial crisis 
of 2008 as the worst economic downturn since the Great Depression (e.g., Ro, 2013; 
Sorkin, 2010; Reuters, 2009).  Initially, Lehman Brothers, the fourth-largest firm on Wall 
Street, was in major trouble.  Bear Stearns was allowed to go bankrupt, causing the stock 
market to plummet and creating a global panic among banks and banking customers.  
This immediately caused financial trouble for Lehman Brothers (Sorkin, 2010).  The 
financial sector is so dependent on the trust of investors that when news leaked that Bear 
Stearns was on shaky ground, panicky investors refused to trade with Bear Stearns, 
thereby bringing about the demise of the firm much more quickly than any analysts 
imagined (Sorkin, 2010).  After an unpopular bailout where Bear Stearns was sold to 
JPMorgan for $2 per share, Lehman Brothers was considered next most likely to fail.  
Over the weekend of September 13-14, 2008, a deal was arranged for either Bank of 
America or Barclays to purchase Lehman Brothers, much as how the U.S. Treasury 
arranged for Bear Stearns’s purchase (Sorkin, 2010).   
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However, the deal fell through with potential buyers, and Lehman Brothers was 
allowed to go under.  The global repercussions were severe.  The decision led to a 
number of unforeseen consequences, which resulted in the United States government 
having to take steps to provide enormous amounts of credit to large banks and investment 
banking firms such as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  The 
government also created a Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) for banks to disburse 
“problematic” loans (Sorkin, 2010).  TARP allowed the U.S.  Treasury to purchase 
and/or insure up to $700 billion of “troubled assets” (CBO, 2009).  In other words, TARP 
allowed the Treasury to purchase illiquid or “junk” assets from banks and other financial 
institutions.  TARP was meant to help stabilize the market and keep the mortgage and 
credit markets liquid.  Despite these efforts by the Treasury, many consumers still lost 
their trust in the strength and stability of these banks as foreclosure rates skyrocketed and 
mortgages became difficult to obtain, which led the banking industry to have to work to 
repair its damaged relationships with American consumers as well as assuage public 
anger for the bailout (and its causes).   
Today, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo all exist.  These banks 
were deemed “too big to fail” by the government.  “Too big to fail” is an interesting 
rhetorical construct.  Too big to fail means these banks are considered to hold too great a 
market share and are so interconnected that they will be supported by the government 
when they face difficulty (Lin, 2012).  The term was popularized in 1984 during a set of 
Congressional hearings on the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) 
intervention with Illinois (Dash, 2009a).  Too big to fail allows banks to participate in 
risky lending and trading practices without actually absorbing any of the risk (also 
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referred to by economists as moral hazard).  Rather, these banks could be unforgiving in 
their lending and trading practices as they had a promise from the government that they 
would not be allowed to go under.   
Today, these banks are larger than ever.  For example, JPMorgan not only bought 
Bear Stearns, but also merged with Chase (Sorkin, 2010).  Whereas before the financial 
crisis there were several large banks, today there are fewer banks that are even larger.  
The Wall Street Journal reported the number of federally insured banking institutions 
nationwide is 6,891, falling below 7,000 banks nationwide for the first time since federal 
regulators began keeping track in 1934 (Tracy, 2013).  The size of these institutions is 
often what causes financial analysts to pause and question the economic stability that 
currently exists.  Corder (2009) and Chan (2011) have gone so far as to argue that the 
current financial system has not fixed these issues and that there will be another, more 
severe, financial crisis.  What have these financial institutions done in order to ensure 
their survival and rebuild shareholder and stakeholder trust and confidence in their firms? 
Issue management involves the practice of calculated corporate discourse, the use of 
apologia to avert crises and downplay issues, and the management of the lifecycles of 
issues (e.g., Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Hearit, 1995a; Heath, 1986; Crable & Vibbert, 
1985).  As a result, this thesis will examine the issue management techniques employed 
by three financial institutions in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis in order to 




1.2 Financial Public Relations  
As was established earlier, there is not a wealth of literature on financial public 
relations1, despite the number of financial public relations practitioners and the strength 
and size of many U.S. financial institutions.  Consequently, there is a need to build up the 
body of literature in regards to financial public relations practices.  This will allow 
scholars to more appropriately represent the day-to-day practice of public relations in the 
literature.    
Scholars have previously examined the dot-com bubble, financial ethics, 
organizational transparency, and various financial reporting tools to examine financial 
institutions and the practice of financial public relations (e.g., Camiciottoli, 2011; 
Christensen & Langer, 2009).  Kiousis, Popescu, and Mitrook (2007) compared public 
relations content, news media coverage, public opinion, and corporate financial 
performance for 28 U.S. companies, and they found that mentions of corporate vision, 
leadership, and other managerial traits in The Wall Street Journal were significantly 
correlated with financial performance.  Kiousis et al. argued that for public relations 
practitioners, these findings are important in that they stress the importance of crafting 
strategic corporate communication messages.  Furthermore, these messages impacted the 
                                                
1 Excluding book reviews, an examination of the last six years of Journal of Public Relations Research and 
Public Relations Review was conducted to determine the exact number of articles published on financial 
public relations.  Including articles on financial news coverage, Journal of Public Relations Research had 
published two articles since 2007 (2007, 2012) and Public Relations Review had published five journal 
articles since 2007 (2011 (two articles), 2012 (two articles), and 2013).    
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financial performance of corporations, further providing support for the importance of the 
everyday practice of financial public relations.   
SEC filings and voluntary financial disclosure have been studied (e.g., Camiciottoli, 
2011), but other day-to day practices and the impact of financial public relations have not 
been studied.  For example, how communication and, more specifically, rhetoric impacts 
economic expectations has not been discussed in the literature.  This is a worthwhile area 
to study for three reasons.  First, studying how rhetoric impacted economic performance 
and expectations following the 2008 financial crisis could allow for a better 
understanding of the financial crisis and how rhetoric can influence economic 
performance.  Second, this area of study has potential implications for organizations in 
the practice of financial public relations.  Understanding how rhetoric can shape the 
practice of financial public relations can better inform practitioners and scholars.  Third, 
this study does add to the literature on day-to-day public relations activities.  Studying the 
rhetorical themes used in press releases, annual reports, letters to shareholders, and ad 
buys used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo may allow for a better 
understanding of how strategic communication can correspond with performance gains, 
performance losses, and re-legitimation. 
Rhetorical theory is central to strategic issue management since rhetoric requires 
people—and organizations—to be good and have a sound character, an assumption 
stemming from Quintilian (Heath & Palenchar, 2009, p.  41).  According to Heath and 
Palenchar, publics and organizations refine fact, value, and policy, allowing rhetoric to 
include identification and “co-created narratives.” Consequently, rhetoric matters when 
discussing economic expectations and financial public relations because of how rhetoric 
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can create identification and co-created narratives.  The Federal Reserve puts out press 
releases on a regular basis attempting to influence the domestic (or even global) economy.  
Yet scholars have not examined how these strategic narratives impact the day to day 
economy despite Heath’s (1993) statement that “business discourse invents reality” (p.  
142).  There is some literature on public policy aspects of issue management, an area 
closely tied to financial issue management (e.g., Hallahan, 2000; Waymer & Heath, 
2007).  Waymer and Heath (2007) examined the effects of activist public relations and 
how this impacts public policy decisions.  As a result, it is worthwhile to respond to this 
disparity between the amount of financial public relations research and the daily practice 
of public relations in a financial context.   
 
1.3 Issue Management and Legitimation  
Issue management involves the practice of calculated corporate discourse, the use of 
apologia to avert crises and downplay issues, and the management of the lifecycles of 
issues (e.g., Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Hearit, 1995a; Heath, 1986; Crable & Vibbert, 
1985).  Issue management allows organizations to garner legitimacy, both actional and 
institutional.  Legitimacy, at root, is whether an organization can continue to exist.  
Actional legitimacy is when specific organizational actions are identified as legitimate or 
approved in the public sphere.  Institutional legitimacy is when an institution as a whole 
is considered legitimate by its publics (Dowling & Pfeffer, 1975; Francesconi, 1982; 
Boyd, 2000).  By keeping the legitimacy of an organization or the legitimacy of an 
organization’s actions in mind, issue managers can better keep an organization out of a 
crisis.  The practice of issue management can maintain the legitimacy of an organization, 
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support for its actions, and garner support from stakeholders and shareholders (Heath, 
1986).   
The financial crisis of 2008 provides a unique frame to examine legitimacy in that the 
specific actions of these big Wall Street banks were deemed socially irresponsible, 
thereby threatening their institutional legitimacy.  In response to this legitimation threat, 
each of these banks took specific, discursive steps in order to preserve and restore their 
image as socially responsible, strong, and stable banks.  Through the use of public 
relations, these banks were able to disseminate strategic messages designed to bolster 
stakeholder support and the legitimacy of the bank.  I explore both the building of 
institutional legitimacy and the bolstering of actional legitimacy regarding the specific 
actions of acceptance of federal funds through the TARP program, banks scapegoating 
blame through personnel changes, and banks continuing to be involved in mortgage-
backed securities.  How these banks reacted to this legitimation crisis informed their 
rhetorical image restoration tactics.  In turn, the rhetorical strategies used to restore each 
bank’s image inform how these banks communicate financial and financial risk 
information today. 
The choice to use the theoretical frame of issue management instead of crisis 
communication is deliberate.  Issue management has the overarching goal of enhancing 
the current and long-term performance of an organization as it manages “organizational 
and community resources through the public policy process to advance organizational 
interests and rights by striking a mutual balance with those of stakeholders” (Heath, 
2006a, p.79).  Heath goes so far as to argue legitimacy is the central tenet of issue 
management as organizations manage and balance shareholder and organizational 
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interests.  A crisis is an “untimely event that can be anticipated to occur .  .  .  .  If 
unattended or poorly managed, the crisis can prevent the organization from making 
satisfactory progress toward achieving its mission and vision” (Heath, 2009, p.  280).  In 
this thesis, I will focus on post crisis issue management when JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo were past the financial crisis, and the day-to-day survival of 
these banks was not in question.  Rather, the government had extended TARP funds, the 
banks stabilized, and JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo could begin 
focusing on rebuilding organizational and actional legitimacy—or, in other words, on 
decreasing the issues facing the banks from crisis to current or imminent (Crable & 
Vibbert, 1985).   
The specific themes and strategies each bank used to rebuild stakeholder and 
shareholder trust can be applied to other financial institutions facing threats to their 
legitimacy in the aftermath of the poor conveyance of financial (and financial risk) 
information.  Additionally, this study underscores the importance and value of public 
relations to organizations.  The practice of public relations within a financial context can 
help organizations disclose financial information, navigate economic bubbles, and 
respond to calls for increased financial transparency (e.g., Camiciottoli, 2011).  If 
financial public relations is mismanaged, consequences can be severe, from criminal 
convictions for practitioners to corporate dissolution.  As a result, the practice of public 
relations in a financial context is of great importance and value to corporations.   
Based on the intersections of the literature on financial public relations, image 
restoration, and legitimacy, this project will more fully review this literature in order to 
draw conclusions about the modern practice of financial public relations, strategic issue 
12 
 
management, and corporate discourse.  This study offers seven research questions and a 
set of methods through which to answer the research questions.  The thesis will analyze 
press releases, annual reports, and statements to shareholders.  In this analysis, specific 
themes will be identified for JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  
These themes will be compared and contrasted.  Then, the rhetorical messages will be 
evaluated through a comparison of market shares, stocks, and net profits for each bank 
quarter by quarter in 2009.  The final chapter will discuss the themes that emerge and 
provide tentative applications and implications for these findings. 
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CHAPTER 2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
The most basic measure of legitimacy is whether an organization can continue to 
exist.  In cases such as Enron, Arthur Andersen, and TWA, even very large organizations 
lost legitimacy and were unable to continue.  In the case of the banks involved in the 
financial crisis, however, they were able to restore enough legitimacy that they have 
continued to operate.  Understanding how they constructed messages toward this 
outcome will be the subject of this thesis and the scholarly literature that will undergird it.  
To more fully understand the rhetorical strategies these banking institutions used that 
seemed to correspond with maintaining their legitimacy, I will examine JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo’s post-crisis issue management discourse from 
January 2009 through December 2009.  This time frame will allow for an in-depth 
examination of the post-crisis issue management used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo as their issue managers tried to decrease the issues raised by 
the financial crisis from critical to current or imminent (Crable & Vibbert, 1985).  
Additionally, by January 2009, the survival of these banks was no longer in question.  
Rather, the government and TARP rescued these banks financially, so these banks needed 
to focus on re-establishing legitimacy and trust with shareholders, stakeholders, 
employees, and consumers using issue management and financial public relations.  Issue 
management is critical to managerial leadership in the financial industry because 
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financial institutions must maintain the trust of their stakeholders and shareholders.  
Without this trust, financial institutions risk going belly-up, and with a marked increase 
in the size of these financial institutions (Sorkin, 2010), it is detrimental to the economy 
to let one of these banks fail, as evidenced by the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  As 
financial institutions grow larger and their reach increases, trust or a lack of trust in them 
affects increasing numbers of people.  Contemporary issue management requires 
financial institutions to maintain their actional and institutional legitimacy.  To support 
this argument, this paper will examine how financial public relations, legitimacy, and 
image restoration techniques can be used as methods to uphold the legitimacy of 
organizations.    
 
2.1 Financial Public Relations 
In surveying the field of public relations literature, some of the scholarly work that 
does focus on financial relations considers ethics.  Camiciottoli (2011) examined the use 
of “ethical wording,” or strategic communication that portrayed an organization as ethical.  
This ethical wording, meant to convey the Aristotelian concept of ethos, was used by 
CEOs of financial institutions following the global financial crisis in an attempt to 
persuade stakeholders of the company’s ethical stance in an economically trying time.  
By using the global financial crisis as a backdrop, she found the language used by 
executives focused on moving forward and regaining shareholder and stakeholder trust.  
The surveyed executives focused on wording such as “trustworthiness,” “responsible,” 
“commitment,” and “moving forward.” The term “continue” was used most frequently 
and allowed executives to highlight the reliability and trustworthiness of the company in 
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its efforts to rebound from the global recession.  Additionally, the use of these terms 
reassured audiences of the company’s commitment to and confidence in the future which 
allowed executives to counterbalance the financial weaknesses they reported.  
Camiciottoli (2011) proposed further studies on similar topics (e.g., earnings calls of 
companies all reporting consistently strong performance) to evaluate the discourse used 
by these organizations.   
Instead of further studying the rhetoric used in earnings calls, by reshaping 
Camiciottoli’s study to focus less on ethical language and more on image reparation in 
this study, her findings are expanded and potentially supported.  Camiciottoli argued that 
although the primary purpose of financial reports is to transmit factual data, research has 
shown financial reports contain rhetoric portraying the company to its stakeholders as 
credible and trustworthy (e.g., Bhatia, 2010; Malavasi, 2006; Piotti, 2006; Schlegelmilch 
& Pollach, 2005).  Consequently, by examining the financial reports disseminated by 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo as examples of their financial 
public relations, I found rhetoric presenting each of these banks as credible and 
trustworthy in an attempt to rebuild their images.   
 Goodnight and Green (2010) examined the dot-com bubble (1992-2002) as a 
rhetorical movement and drew connections to the 2008 financial crisis.  The authors 
found the immense changes in economic practices that accompanied the dot-com bubble 
now impact other areas, such as health, education, agriculture, housing, and media 
organizations.  All these fields have access to new technologies, which generate 
“unpredictable, mimetic vectors that destabilize and transform risk cultures” (p.  133).  
This change in risk culture pushes institutions and organizations into unanticipated 
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change through rhetorical movement, which is defined as “the migration of an argument 
or appeal from the controversy that originally contained it to quite different 
circumstances or events” (p.  134).  Since new communication technologies lead to 
globalization and organizational interconnectivity, Goodnight and Green argued that 
“interlocking fragility” has occurred with only the appearance of stability.  The authors 
quoted Henry Paulson, the U.S.  Secretary of Treasury during the 2008 financial crisis, as 
having said, “When you look at the complexity of the system and all the interconnectivity 
and size of these institutions, that is the challenge” (p. 133).  This discussion of economic 
bubbles allows for a better understanding of the interconnectedness of the three banks 
discussed in this thesis and how the rhetorical actions of one bank can impact any of the 
other large banks.  Therefore, it is important to examine the specific rhetorical actions 
each bank used in recovering from the 2008 financial crisis.   
Studying the financial public relations activity of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo following the 2008 financial crisis has implications for the 
fields of organizational communication, public relations, and economics.  Specifically, 
understanding how rhetoric can influence global and domestic economic performance 
may have long-term implications as financial institutions become increasingly 
interconnected.  Additionally, organizational communication may benefit from 
understanding how rhetoric potentially influences organizational financial performance 
and how the practice of financial public relations corresponds with organizational 
financial performance.  Public relations scholars have examined some financial public 
relations strategies, such as rhetoric and organizational transparency.  However, these 
strategies have not been studied in depth following financial downturns or crises, nor 
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have they been connected with the image repair of financial institutions (only economic 
recovery such as in Camiciottoli’s 2011 article).  Consequently, this project serves to 
address these gaps in the literature in order to better connect the scholarship in financial 
public relations and issue management.  Studying financial public relations can advance 
the fields of issue management and crisis communication by better informing scholars 
and practitioners how to manage finance-related issues and crises for organizations.  
Moreover, public relations scholarship has struggled with how to articulate its value to 
chief executives and the upper management of organizations (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 
2002).  Financial public relations may provide a more tangible value to organizations 
when financial public relations practitioners can more deftly navigate the difficult terrain 
of economic bubbles, organizational interconnectivity, and the calls for transparency in 
an age of increased technology and globalization.  The 2008 financial crisis provides a 
lens through which to study these questions and contribute in a meaningful way to the 
public relations, organizational communication, and managerial leadership literature.   
 
2.2 Strategic Issue Management  
When organizations face a crisis, academics and social critics focus on how 
organizations utilize their communication techniques to rebuild their reputation, clientele, 
and shareholders.  However, crises often occur when companies fail to practice issue 
management, or when they are unsuccessful in their efforts to prevent the progression of 
an issue into a crisis.  Crable and Vibbert (1985) discuss the cycles of issues, identifying 
the steps public relations practitioners must follow to identify potential issues in an effort 
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to prevent them from becoming critical issues.  When an issue reaches this stage, issue 
management has failed.   
An issue is created when one or more human agents attach significance to a 
situation or perceived problem (Crable & Vibbert, 1985).  These issues can never be 
resolved as they are situations in which “relief but not total solution is found” since 
people and groups of people “make” issues out of matters in which they have an interest 
(p. 5).  According to Crable and Vibbert, issues have five basic levels of status: potential 
(some person or group demonstrates an interest in an issue), imminent (if the potential 
issue has been accepted by others), current (issue has become a means of exchange), 
critical (“crisis” stage where people identify with some side of the issue), and dormant 
(issue has been dealt with in some way).  Issue management, then, involves attention to 
issues at any level (p. 7) and the desire of issue managers to lower the status of issues.  
This thesis will consistently deal with the lifecycle of issues as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo took active steps to lower post 2008 financial crisis issues 
from critical (or “crisis”) to current or imminent.  These banks strove to decrease the 
status of issues and improve relationships with key publics (e.g., shareholders, employees, 
and customers/stakeholders) by using post-crisis narratives, rhetorical strategies, and 
legitimacy bolstering. 
Gaunt and Ollenburger (1995) pointed out that issue management is much more 
proactive than crisis management.  Issue management tries to identify issues and 
influence decisions regarding the issues before the issues have a detrimental effect on the 
corporation, such a decrease or loss of legitimacy.  Heath (1976) also suggested 
communication campaigns are vital to the total issue management process, as these 
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campaigns include both preventative and persuasive elements.  Through the process of 
issue management and issue management campaigns, organizations attempt to eliminate 
any possibility of outrage by identifying and dealing with issues as they emerge before 
they become public knowledge (Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995).  Additionally, some 
scholars view issue management as the avenue by which public relations practitioners can 
earn a seat at the table of the dominant coalition and take a more significant role in the 
decision-making processes of organizational management (Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995).  
This is important to the field of public relations, especially in response to calls by Grunig, 
Grunig, and Dozier (2002) to determine the value of public relations within organizations.  
For public relations in a financial context, a misstep in public relations could mean a 
violation of financial law, compromising the organization’s finances, or even impacting 
the national and/or global economy.  For financial institutions like JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, the practice of public relations appears to be of even 
greater importance in light of the interconnectedness of the banking sector and the impact 
on the global economy.  Consequently, this study will explore potential correlations 
between the public relations activities used by these banks and their continued actional 
and institutional legitimacy.    
One way organizations throughout the process of issue management attempt to 
keep issues at a lower level (i.e., potential, imminent, etc.) is through values advocacy.  
Values advocacy allows organizations to identify positive areas of agreement with key 
publics (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994).  Bostdorff and Vibbert (1994) use the example of 
Phillips Petroleum during the 1970s as an illustration of values advocacy.  The company 
used advertisements that focused on how the Phillips Petroleum’s fuel additive allowed 
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for a helicopter rescue of Becky Sharp from a snowy mountain instead of focusing on the 
company’s product.  This proved a successful advertisement campaign for Phillips 
Petroleum.  Organizations routinely engage in values advocacy in order to perform three 
distinct functions: enhance their images, deflect criticism (both of the company and/or its 
policies), and to establish value premises that can be used in later persuasive efforts 
(Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994).  Values advocacy is a rhetorical construct because “its role 
is to intensify adherence to values, adherence without which discourses that aim at 
provoking action cannot find the lever to move or inspire their listeners” (p.  143).  
Values advocacy, while seemingly simple, requires sophisticated persuasion to achieve 
these three goals (Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994).  Values advocacy can be practiced in a 
variety of ways, such as through the use of advocacy advertising (Heath, 1986).  In order 
to learn from the 2008 financial crisis, I would like to examine whether values advocacy 
was used to manage the status of issues for JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and 
Wells Fargo.  Additionally, examining whether each company’s values were laid as 
groundwork prior to the financial crisis or if the financial crisis provided an opportunity 
to begin using values advocacy as a method for controlling these issues can provide 
insight on how these banks were able to regain their stability and stakeholder trust.   
 
2.3 Legitimacy 
Legitimacy is closely related to issue management.  Heath (2009) boldly claimed 
“legitimacy is a (perhaps the) central theme in issue management.”  Fleisher (2001) 
observed that publics in general and around the world tend to doubt that corporate 
interests correspond to theirs.  Issue management is a clash for legitimacy (and power)” 
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(Heath, 2009, pp. 9-10).  Indeed, failed issue management could lead to a decline or loss 
of organizational legitimacy and organizational power.  Crisis communication scholars 
(e.g., Sellnow & Seeger, 2013; Coombs, 2007a; Coombs, 2007b) have developed theories 
in an attempt to describe the process that occurs after a crisis when organizations begin to 
repair relationships with major shareholders, stakeholders, and other key publics in order 
to regain organizational legitimacy.  Examining how organizations rebuild legitimacy 
using the 2008 financial crisis allows for a better understanding of how rhetoric can shape 
economic outcomes and expectations.  As financial institutions go through severe 
economic downturns and struggle with massive monetary loss and malpractice, the 
rebuilding of organizational legitimacy is key for practitioners and scholars to understand.   
Functionally, organizational legitimacy contains two components; an organization 
or company as a whole may be judged legitimate or not, but its individual acts can also be 
judged as individually legitimate or not—this second type of legitimacy is called actional 
legitimacy.  Actional legitimacy can be established when corporations attempt to 
demonstrate the legitimacy of specific policies or actions, not of the entire corporation 
(Boyd, 2000).  On the other hand, institutional legitimacy refers to as an institution’s 
need for publics to recognize its authority to operate and exercise authority in a broader 
social context (Boyd, 2000).  It concerns the degree to which corporate activities are 
congruent with the values of the social system in which they operate (Dowling & Pfeffer, 
1975).  The actions of an organization are legitimate, for example, to the degree that they 
can be shown to reflect public values such as telling the truth and not damaging the 
environment.   
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Bridges (2004) discussed legitimacy gap theory as occurring when discrepancies 
in the organization’s behavior and society’s expectations of that organization threaten the 
organization’s status as a legitimate member of the business community, and thus its 
survival.  Originating with Sethi (1975, 1979), legitimacy gap theory claimed the 
discrepancy in expectations arises from two situations.  First, an organization has 
changed its way of doing business, or has had an inappropriate behavior discovered.  
Alternatively, the organization has not changed or hidden its behavior, but society has 
changed its evaluation of the organization’s performance.  Studies have found that certain 
behaviors can lead to an awareness of an organization’s stakeholders of a gap in their 
expectations and the actions of the organization.  For example, Heath (1997) posited that 
stakeholders are generally moved to activism by issues that revolved around security 
from intolerable risks, fairness, equality, and the environment.  Bridges (2004) also found 
that changing social values can change perceptions of an organization’s behavior.  
Consequently, it falls to issue managers to be alert to changing stakeholder values as 
legitimacy gap theory serves as a caution for organizations.  Heath (1994, 1997) found 
that different values and ethical standards contributed to differing perceptions of 
legitimacy, so it behooves issue managers to respond to changing values and ethical 
standards and avoid responding to only shareholders (Bridges, 2004).   
A legitimation crisis, then, occurs when stakeholders perceive an incongruity to 
exist between a corporation’s values, as evidenced in its acts, and those of the larger 
social system in which it operates.  A corporation faces major hurdles to its survival when 
its actions are perceived to be inconsistent with these values (Francesconi, 1982).  In a 
crisis situation, stakeholders essentially send a message to the organization that its deeds 
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lack actional legitimacy.  Crisis communication broadly aims to reestablish the 
legitimacy of an industry or of a corporation in a larger social system (Hearit, 1995).  
Boyd (2000) argued that consistent and effective actional legitimation can prevent a crisis, 
thus illustrating the importance of this practice to issue management.    
The legitimacy of a corporation or its actions depends on the perceptions of key 
publics (Boyd, 2000).  Corporations profit financially from their key publics.  Based on 
this point, Boulding (1978) pointed out that corporations must clearly establish their 
legitimacy to maintain financial success.  Furthermore, Seeger (1986) observed that any 
institution that depended on its relationships with external publics emphasized 
legitimation strategies, especially because of a corporation’s reliance on government, 
consumer, and social acceptance.  Based on this clear necessity for key publics (e.g., 
shareholders, stakeholders) to accept the actions of an organization as legitimate, it was 
only logical that an organization must maintain a coalition of publics that are supportive, 
allowing for that coalition to have legitimacy-determining power (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
1978).  Therefore, legitimation is socially constructed and controlled by publics, and 
interested stakeholders must confer legitimacy for a corporation to survive and exist 
(Boyd, 2000).   
Legitimation is particularly important in the financial industry.  As previously 
stated, the national and global economy can be impacted quickly due to new 
communication technology and through the use of discourse (Hursti, 2011).  
Consequently, as financial institutions are so reliant on government, consumer, and social 
acceptance to maintain stability and survive, it is of the utmost importance for banks to 
maintain their institutional legitimacy.  Without this legitimacy, severe economic 
24 
 
downturns are possible or banks can collapse, as evidenced by the events of the 2008 
financial crisis.  Financial institutions must pay careful attention via issue management in 
order to maintain the legitimacy conferred by publics and interested stakeholders.  
Without this legitimacy, we will see banks collapse.  And when one bank collapses, due 
to the interconnectivity and globalization of banks, it can cause a severe economic 
recession, a major fiscal loss for shareholders, and perhaps a wider distrust or lack of 
legitimacy for financial institutions in general in the aftermath of a crisis of legitimation.    
Since legitimacy is of importance for the survival of financial organizations, the 
way in which these corporations seek to establish their legitimacy is through rhetoric that 
demonstrates their identification with contemporary social values (Dionisopoulos & 
Vibbert, 1988).  Hearit (1995) argues a social expectation exists that an organization must 
fulfill both a competence and a community requirement to achieve legitimacy.  When 
companies and their chief executives take risks that lead to negative outcomes (such as 
the abuses of mortgage-backed securities trading leading to the 2008 financial crisis or 
the so-called “London Whale” case that created a crisis for JPMorgan Chase CEO Jamie 
Dimon in 2012), companies find themselves caught in a managerial crisis of legitimation 
as they have negated this community requirement or de-identified with contemporary 
social values.  When this occurs, the primary response is through the rhetorical strategies 
of redefinition that function to distance companies from their alleged wrong and 
reestablish organizational legitimacy (Francesconi, 1982; Hearit, 1995).  This study 
looked for these re-legitimation strategies through the examination of JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo’s rhetoric after the 2008 financial crisis.   
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 Through the examination of relevant literature in the areas of financial public 
relations, issue management, and legitimacy, there is an intersection exploring how 
financial institutions employ public relations to manage issues or rebuild an 
organizational image that has not been widely explored.  Heath (1993) proposed that a 
rhetorical approach to public relations is a form of social influence where persuasion is 
interactive and viewpoints can be debated in public.  Consequently, studying the 
intersection of financial public relations, issue management, and legitimacy from a 
rhetorical perspective allows for an exploration of how organizations influence the public 
discourse.  However, it also allows an exploration of how the public discourse influences 
the organization, the issue management strategies used by an organization, and how 
legitimacy is given or revoked by stakeholders and shareholders.  If an organization’s 
actional or institutional legitimacy is threatened, the rhetorical strategies of restoration 
and repair may be used and can correspond with performance gains or losses by the 
organization.   
The financial crisis of 2008 provides a unique backdrop to study this intersection 
because these big Wall Street banks were deemed socially irresponsible, thereby 
threatening their institutional legitimacy and specific actions where considered 
reprehensible (e.g., the trading of mortgage-backed securities).  In response to this 
legitimation threat, each of these banks took specific rhetorical steps in order to preserve 
and restore their image as socially responsible, strong, and stable banks.  Through the use 
of public relations, these banks were able to disseminate strategic messages designed to 
bolster stakeholder support and the institutional/actional legitimacy of the bank.  How 
these banks reacted to this legitimation crisis informed their discursive image restoration 
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tactics.  In turn, the discursive strategies used to restore each bank’s image inform how 
these banks communicate financial and financial risk information today.   
As JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo still exist and are 
considered successful today, it is worthwhile to study the rhetorical issue management 
used to restore each bank’s organizational and actional legitimacy.  I will explore both 
the building of institutional legitimacy and the bolstering of actional legitimacy regarding 
acceptance of federal funds through the TARP program, banks scapegoating blame 
through personnel changes, and banks continuing to be involved in mortgage-backed 
securities.  Based on this review of the literature and the gap of literature at the 
intersection of issue management and financial public relations, this study aims to 
address the following related questions:  
 
1a: How do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo use legitimacy to lower 
the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
1b: How do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo use narratives to lower 
the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
1c: What rhetorical strategies do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
use to lower the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
2a:  Are there themes that emerge in the financial public relations used by JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo?  
2b: How do the themes used by JPMorgan Chase compare to its quarterly financial 
reports (including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009? 
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2c: How do the themes used by Bank of America compare to its quarterly financial 
reports (including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009?  
2d: How do the themes used by Wells Fargo compare to its quarterly financial reports 
(including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009?
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CHAPTER 3. METHODS 
In order to better explore the intersections of financial public relations, image 
restoration, and legitimacy, a rhetorical analysis will be used.  Following Heath’s (1993) 
and Toth’s (2009) call for rhetorical approaches to the study of public relations, I will 
explore how the rhetoric used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
corresponded with performance gains or losses and re-legitimation.  This chapter will 
provide an overview of the specific methodology the thesis used and approaches to 
analysis of the data collected in order to address the research questions this study asks.   
 
3.1 Close Textual Analysis 
Previous research on financial public relations and issue management has taken a 
rhetorical approach to research (e.g., Botan & Taylor, 2004; Blaney, Benoit, & Brazeal, 
2002; Brinson & Benoit, 1999).  The study of rhetoric focuses on how individuals, 
groups, and organizations make meaning, and how—using rhetoric—individuals, groups, 
and organizations can create issues, resolve issues, compete, or build a coalition to solve 
problems (Toth, 2009).  Rhetoricians argue symbolic behavior can create and influence 
relationships between organizations and publics through “the wrangle in the marketplace” 
where words, visuals, and actions can communicate information and shape beliefs
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(Heath, 2009).  Theoreticians appear to agree rhetoric is both a response to situations and 
something that creates and shapes situations (Ihlen, 2011, p. 460).  The rhetor has 
creativity, allowing rhetorical situations to represent both constraints and opportunities (p. 
461).  Specifically, Ihlen said, “the discourse tradition within which a rhetor operates 
produces the conditions for its own continuation, recirculation, and reproduction” (p. 
461).  Rather than talking about how a problem “can be controlled,” Ihlen argued instead 
that rhetoric should be active and creative in influencing (or creating) a rhetorical 
situation.  By using a rhetorical approach, the specific discourse used by JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo that was active and creative in influencing the 
rhetorical situation each bank found itself in can be better identified and used to draw 
potential implications for the practice of financial public relations.  Furthermore, how 
each financial organization used discourse to resolve the issues arising after the 2008 
financial crisis (e.g., perceived trustworthiness and stability) can be studied as well.   
Toth (2009), in a synthesis of the rhetorical perspective of public relations, states 
that the public record is the unit of analysis most often used by rhetorical scholars 
because public statements and documents are retrievable.  These retrievable messages 
have historically been sent to key publics by way of annual reports, online pressrooms, 
intranets, Internet social networks, and new employee orientations (Toth, 2009).  As 
rhetoricians work from a humanistic stance (i.e., personal judgments are an important 
contribution to the analysis of interaction), they are their own measuring instruments, 
“making judgments based on their self-perceptions of events or texts rather than asking 
others for their interpretations of what the events or texts mean” (Toth, 2009, p. 52).   
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In this study, I will use close textual analysis to examine JPMorgan Chase, Bank 
of America, and Wells Fargo’s organizational messages from the public record.  Each 
bank tried to rebuild actional and institutional legitimacy in response to mass outcry from 
various key publics.  These key publics (specifically shareholders, customers, and 
employees) had different stakes in these banks, but were all at risk if they continued to do 
business with these banks.  Specifically, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells 
Fargo’s publics communicated that these bank’s lending practices were not deemed 
legitimate once information emerged about the risky mortgage-backed securities banks 
were trading.  I read newspaper articles from The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal to provide a picture from different ideological perspectives regarding the 
acceptance of federal funds the TARP program, banks scapegoating (or potentially 
implying) blame through personnel changes, and banks continuing to be involved in 
mortgage-backed securities in order to examine particular policies requiring actional 
legitimacy from these bank’s publics.  Heath (2009) discusses how no issue develops, or 
is maintained, in a vacuum.  Reporters frame news events in various ways, such as in 
terms of past events that are similar and relevant.  As a result, it was worthwhile to 
pursue an understanding of how the media reported and framed the 2008 financial crisis 
to understand which policies and actions (e.g., trading mortgage-backed securities, 
derivatives trading, etc.) resulted in de-legitimation.  If these policies are still in place 
today, I examined the methods each bank used to rebuild the legitimacy of these actions.   
The lack of actional legitimacy contributed to a loss of institutional legitimacy, 
including the conversations about whether any organization should be considered “too 
big to fail.” I followed the same method used for determining actional legitimacy 
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restoration strategies for the study of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells 
Fargo’s institutional legitimacy restoration.  The 2008 financial crisis and the resulting 
need for banks to rebuild institutional legitimacy provides a frame through which 
rhetoricians can examine the overall efforts to rebuild institutional legitimacy and 
determine the way these financial institutions interacted with key stakeholders and 
shareholders.  I then compared the themes that emerge from this discourse to the 
quarterly financial performance of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  
This will provide a potential understanding of how rhetoric correlated to each bank’s 
survival and re-legitimation and how each bank’s financial performance corresponded 
with (if at all) the rhetoric used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo. 
 
3.2 JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
The decision to use JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo to 
analyze the image restoration strategies employed after the financial crisis when 
innumerable financial institutions were found in a legitimation crisis (e.g., other banking 
organizations, AIG, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, etc.) was based on three reasons.   
First, JPMorgan Chase has been considered the bank that best navigated the 2008 
financial crisis (Craig & Silver-Greenberg, 2013a).  JPMorgan Chase’s board of directors, 
risk committee, and audit committee guided the organization through the financial crisis 
without a single losing quarter, and in an astonishing display of finesse, has reported 
three years of record performance (Craig & Silver-Greenberg, 2013a).  By choosing a 
bank with a strong record throughout and after the financial crisis, I anticipate themes 
such as “ongoing stability” and “trust” will emerge from their messages to stakeholders 
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and shareholders as the literature has suggested (e.g., Camiciottoli, 2011).  Furthermore, 
if JPMorgan Chase was on stronger footing than many of the other banks on Wall Street, 
it may have provided leadership regarding messages to key publics and stakeholders that 
worked.  Consequently, I expect themes that emerge from JPMorgan Chase’s post-crisis 
discourse will overlap with themes found among the other banks.  However, I expect to 
find discourse that did not emerge from other banks as JPMorgan Chase was perhaps 
better equipped to handle the fallout of the financial crisis.  Especially considering the 
strength and size of JPMorgan Chase, it may provide some of the best practices for 
financial institutions seeking to repair a tarnished image.    
Second, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo are three of the top 
five largest banks on Wall Street and all three banks were consistently in the media 
limelight post-financial crisis.  As a result, this provides more texts to analyze in the form 
of press releases and other online messaging and allows a better opportunity to look for 
overlapping themes and best practices.   
Third, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo are part of the “too 
big to fail” banking industry on Wall Street.  Since these banks are among the largest, 
they are also among some of the most interconnected financial institutions (Sorkin, 2010).  
One bank’s actions have the potential to greatly influence another bank’s actions.  As a 
result, if one of these banks does fail, it has severe repercussions on the other large 
banking institutions and the domestic and global economy.  Therefore, I expect that 
several larger meta-themes will emerge from the discourse across these three banks, 
leading to an exploration of potential correlations between the rhetoric of JPMorgan 
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Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo, and their continued actional and institutional 
legitimacy.    
 
3.3 Post-Crisis Recovery Period 
Since this paper focuses on issue management and JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo’s attempts to restore their actional and institutional legitimacy, 
I will focus on texts from 2009.  The time period was chosen to focus on post-crisis 
actions and issue management on the part of the banking firms.  The texts I have chosen 
to evaluate are all part of the strategic communication offered by each bank’s public 
relations specialists, financial public relations practitioners, and official spokespersons.  
By analyzing the rhetoric of these texts individually, it is my intention to identify the 
discursive techniques and patterns used to rebuild organizational legitimacy in the 
aftermath of the mortgage crisis.  Based on Camiciottoli’s (2011) research, I expect to 
find themes centered around the concepts of institutional trustworthiness, stability, and 
ethics.   
Rowland and Jerome (2004) have argued that image maintenance is an important 
part of post-crisis recovery.  Since the financial crisis occurred in 2008, texts from 2009 
will provide a window through which image maintenance and image repair strategies that 
emerged in conjunction with the post-financial crisis fiscal recovery can be examined.  
Additionally, the rhetoric used by each bank at differing points of 2009 can perhaps 




3.4 Press Releases and Annual Reports as Tools of Organizational Message 
Dissemination  
The specific discourse examined in this analysis constitutes representative 
exemplars that represent the core argument of each bank’s legitimation response.  The 
discourse under consideration includes: 1) news releases issued by JPMorgan Chase, 
Bank of America, and Wells Fargo from January 2009-December 2009 concerning each 
bank’s image, stability, and trustworthiness, 2) the 2009 Annual Report to each bank’s 
shareholders, and 3) the 2009 Annual Letter to each bank’s shareholders.   
While there are certainly other texts to examine, these three will be used as 
articulating the core messages of the banks to attempt to rebuild legitimacy and regain the 
trust of key stakeholders.  I will use inductive thematic analysis based on the grounded 
theory method (Strauss & Corbin, 1994) to code the themes that emerge from these texts 
so that the rhetoric used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo will 
inform the findings.  Using this approach, the themes emerging from each individual 
bank’s texts can then be compared and contrasted with the themes that emerge from the 
other banks in a more concise and reliable manner.  Since scholars have found texts such 
as annual reports and press releases as important tools in disseminating organizational 
messages (e.g., Toth, 2009), I will briefly synthesize the literature on press releases and 
annual reports in order to provide a stronger rationale for the decision to use these texts 
for analysis.   
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3.4.1 Press Releases  
Traditionally, organizations use press releases to share newsworthy information 
with media outlets and internal and external publics.  These press releases are posted on 
organizations’ websites, disseminated via email and news wire to the press, and are then 
broadly disseminated through outlets like PR Newswire (Broom, 2012).  Press releases 
serve a unique role in that they are used to communicate with both external publics (e.g., 
consumers, shareholders) and internal publics (e.g., employees).  The notion of  “auto-
communication,” where corporate speeches, mission statements, advertising campaigns, 
marketing strategies, and marketing analyses are considered “meta-messages that help 
organizations confirm themselves to internal as well as external audiences” demonstrate 
this unique role (Cheney & Christensen, 2001, p. 85).  Press releases function as auto-
communication because organizations can share corporate messages to both internal and 
external stakeholders via press releases, just like speeches, mission statements, or public 
relations campaigns can share messages with internal publics.  
Within the practice of financial public relations, press releases are a tool used to 
engage in the disclosure of financial information because there are legal ramifications 
attached to reporting financial and financial risk information (Broom, 2012; Camiciottoli, 
2011).  For example, full information must be given by an organization concerning 
anything that might materially affect the price of a company’s stock, like the health of a 
CEO (Broom, 2012).  The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) monitors 
organizational activities and statements, as well as the timely disclosure of information 
(Broom, 2012).  Organizations also must report information concerning dividends, 
earnings, annual reports, management changes, product developments, disposition of 
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major assets, purchase of own stock, or the announcement of major contracts or orders as 
legally required by the SEC.  As calls for ethical organizational practices increase, 
Camiciottoli (2011) reports an increase in press releases that voluntarily disclose 
organizational finances.   
The voluntary disclosure of financial information is on the rise as businesses have 
begun using voluntary forms of financial reporting (e.g., Beattie, Dhanani, & Jones, 2008; 
Saatchi, 2007; Tasker, 1998).  Businesses are attempting to proactively engage 
stakeholders in a competitive environment.  By voluntarily disclosing financial 
information, Williams (2008) found companies have more control over the messages they 
wish to communicate, achieve greater visibility (thereby distinguishing themselves from 
competitors), and enhance their perceived value (Schlegelmilch & Pollach, 2005).   
As a result, by examining the press releases of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, 
and Wells Fargo in the year following the financial crisis, there may be an increase in 
voluntarily reported financial information as these banks attempt to promote an ethical 
and values-driven image as they seek to rebuild their institutional legitimacy.   
 
3.4.2 Annual Reports  
The literature on annual reports is rich and varied.  Researchers have taken a 
business, economics, and communicative lens to the study of annual reports and provide 
a strong basis on which to analyze the annual reports of the three large banks in this 
proposal.  In fact, one approach to aligning annual reports with the appropriate audiences 
is through the recognition of corporate financial reporting as a process of mass 
communication (e.g., Gerbner, 1969; Parker, 1982).  Based on the definition of mass 
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communication, Parker (1982) argued that financial and accounting reports of public 
companies must qualify as a form of mass communication.  As a result, annual reports 
need to be both accessible and readable for a wide variety of audiences and are 
considered a medium through which a corporation can report to shareholders, 
stakeholders, and other key publics (Parker, 1982).   
Ryan, Dunstan, and Brown (2002) found that annual reports are invaluable in 
establishing and maintaining organizational legitimacy.  Organizations respond to the 
political and social forces of their stakeholders in their adopted annual reporting policies, 
practices, and routines (p.  17), further supporting a rhetorical approach to understanding 
how the discourse evolved throughout the financial crisis.  A rhetorical approach to 
studying annual reports allows for an understanding of the changing discourse and how 
the conversation between stakeholders and shareholders influenced the rhetoric of 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  Annual reports are a way for 
organizations to not only maintain their institutional legitimacy, but to also maintain 
actional legitimacy as annual reports provide an outlet through organizations can 
highlight specific policies or policy changes in response to stakeholder and shareholder 
pressure or public discourse.  I will specifically examine policies and discourse regarding 
acceptance of federal funds through the TARP program, banks scapegoating blame 
through personnel changes, and banks continuing to be involved in mortgage-backed 
securities.  JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo may have used annual 
reports as a tool to respond to a loss of actional legitimacy regarding their practice of, for 
example, trading mortgage-backed securities.  Examining whether the annual reports 
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mentioned any specific policy changes, or if they only mentioned overall institutional 
change, will clarify the kind of legitimacy restoration at work in this instance.   
The reporting of risk by organizations, relevant to the study of financial public 
relations, has increased because of recent economic shifts (Power, 2004).  Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) studied 79 U.K.  company annual reports using content analysis and found 
a positive correlation between the size of an organization and the number of risk 
disclosures (both financial and non-financial).  In researching financial risk specifically, 
the authors categorized financial risk disclosure as concerning the interest rate, exchange 
rate, commodity, liquidity, or credit of the institution.  Consequently, examining whether 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo disclose financial risk information 
will provide further evidence of the rhetorical issue management strategies used 
following the financial crisis.   
Close textual analysis will be used to study press releases, annual reports, and 
annual letters to shareholders in a four-step process.  First, I will go through and read 
each text, coding for general themes that emerge.  After coding these themes, I will see if 
these themes can be lumped into broader, more inclusive themes.  Then, I will compare 
and contrast these themes between each bank and determine if any overarching industry 
themes emerge.  Finally, I will compare these themes with the rhetorical issue 
management and legitimacy literature.   
With regards to legitimacy, as highlighted earlier, I will separate actional and 
institutional legitimacy by examining the mention of specific policies in organizational 
messages from each bank.  I will identify the particular policies requiring actional 
legitimation from these banks’ 
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 publics by reading newspaper articles from The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal concerning each bank from January 2009 through December 2009.  Specifically, 
I will explore the bolstering of actional legitimacy regarding acceptance of federal funds 
through the TARP program, banks scapegoating blame through personnel changes, and 
banks continuing to be involved in mortgage-backed securities as addressed by JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo.  I will look at Forbes and the Reputation 
Institute’s annual corporate reputation survey results from 2009, 2010, and 2012 to 
determine if the reputation of these banks changed dramatically.  By comparing the 2009 
and 2010 results, this will provide a way to begin to measure any changes in JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo’s institutional legitimacy. A rhetorical 
approach will provide a better understanding of how the public discourse of JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo responded to the rhetoric of their stakeholders 




CHAPTER 4. ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, I will first discuss the press coverage in The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal in 2009 to identify particular policies requiring actional and/or 
institutional legitimacy by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo in order 
to lower the status of issues they faced in the lifecycle of issues (Crable & Vibbert, 1985).  
These newspaper articles were collected using LexisNexis to search The New York Times 
and The Wall Street Journal’s archives.  The terms “financial crisis” and each bank’s 
name were used to narrow down the number of articles returned.  Based off the 
significantly higher number of articles returned from The New York Times (n = 665) as 
compared to The Wall Street Journal (n = 104), I read the same number of articles from 
each source.  This meant I read all The Wall Street Journal articles, and 1 in 6 of The New 
York Times articles.  This allowed me to reach saturation, the point at which new 
information does not emerge from the text, and the identified themes were repeated and 
detailed, as recommended by Corbin and Strauss (2008) and Tracey (2013).  I next 
examined each bank’s press releases, annual reports, and the annual letter to shareholders 
for specific discursive themes originated by the banks rather than by the media.  I allowed 
the texts to guide my analysis to allow the themes discussed in this chapter to be shaped 
by each bank’s individual discourse.
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4.1 JPMorgan Chase 
4.1.1 Press Coverage 
Within the print media’s coverage of JPMorgan Chase and the post-financial crisis 
coverage of the bank, several themes reoccurred throughout 2009 that required actional 
and institutional legitimacy from JPMorgan Chase.  Examining policies highlighted by 
the news media (both The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal) allowed for 
potential identification of particular banking policies for which JPMorgan Chase had to 
regain actional and institutional legitimacy.  From an analysis of the news coverage of 
JPMorgan Chase in 2009, three policies emerged as needing actional and institutional 
legitimacy.    
 First, the act of repaying the TARP money was a key action that JPMorgan Chase 
used to regain legitimacy and prove its other actions were legitimate; in addition, 
repaying the TARP money might have contributed to the actional legitimacy of accepting 
the federal relief.  JPMorgan Chase was among the first of the banks to repay its loan 
money (AP, 2009; “TARP”, 2009).  By repaying this loan money early, the media widely 
referred to JPMorgan Chase as the bank that emerged the strongest, and one of the four 
banks most firmly on the road to recovery (Berenson, 2009).  This allowed the bank’s 
actions following the crisis to be considered more legitimate and trustworthy.  For 
example, A.I.G. took a beating in the press (e.g., Story & Dash, 2009) but JPMorgan 
Chase received more positive news coverage in regard to the bank’s stability and 
Dimon’s performance (e.g., Brown, 2009; Calmes & Story, 2009; Eavis, 2009), especially 
after repaying its TARP loan. 
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 Second, the auctioning of warrants, a financial instrument that allows a holder to 
buy stock in the future at a fixed price, was considered the final tie of JPMorgan Chase to 
the bailout of Wall Street.  Again, JPMorgan Chase was among the first banks to auction 
off its warrants (Hernandez, 2009; Leonhardt & Fabrikant, 2009) and this was another 
policy that allowed the bank to regain institutional legitimacy.  By August 21, JPMorgan 
Chase (along with other financial firms including American Express, Goldman Sachs, 
and Morgan Stanley) had already bought back warrants from the Treasury Department.  
This allowed JPMorgan Chase to get out from under the shadow of governmental 
regulation.  Specifically, this was the last step preventing JPMorgan Chase (and other 
banks) from paying bonuses as usual and avoiding governmental regulation of their 
banking practices and policies.  As passed by Congress with the payout of TARP bailout 
funds, banks that received TARP funding were prevented from paying their top 25 
executives bonuses greater than a third of their salary, although there was not a specific 
salary cap (Story & Dash, 2009). 
 The third kind of legitimacy highlighted in media coverage was actional 
legitimacy for the policy of paying bonuses to executives.  As bank bonuses returned to 
pre-crisis levels in late 2009, the media had a heyday.  As JPMorgan Chase began to turn 
a profit, it was considered a wide success for both the bank and the United States 
economy, and JPMorgan Chase was called a “winner” of the crisis (Cyran, 2009).  
However, when less than a full year after the financial crisis JPMorgan Chase began 
issuing bonuses to Jamie Dimon and other key personnel, the media sounded alarms.  
JPMorgan Chase, however, took a few specific actions in an attempt to legitimize its 
executive bonus policy.  One legitimating action by JPMorgan Chase reported by the 
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Times to alleviate some public disgruntlement was to “focus on cost cutting and reducing 
bureaucracy” (Hurt, 2009).  Second, JPMorgan Chase in September named James E. 
Stanley the new head of investment banking.  This was considered an “unexpected 
appointment” as Stanley was considered not within Dimon’s inner ring but had rather 
worked his way up by demonstrating strong results within JPMorgan Chase (Dash, 
2009b).  Again, this shake up in bank leadership may have been in reaction to the media’s 
harsh critiques of JPMorgan Chase’s bonuses.  However, JPMorgan Chase took a third 
step.  In early August, JPMorgan Chase was one of the only banks to put more conditions 
on pay, so it attached more performance benchmarks and imposed a longer wait before 
the pay is awarded.  Through some of these actions, JPMorgan Chase was seen as 
courting both public opinion and Washington as it tried to fend off some types of 
regulation (Story, 2009). 
 Having identified legitimacy issues raised by mainstream media, I will now turn 
to JPMorgan Chase’s public discourse during the same period.   With all three banks, I 
will first extract the themes apparent in each type of text, followed by an assessment of 
how those themes did or did not address the legitimacy issues that publics (represented by 
the mass media) were concerned about. 
 
4.1.2 Press Releases  
Many of the press releases stressed JPMorgan Chase’s community work and high 
quarterly earnings.  For example, press releases that discussed JPMorgan Chase’s 
enhanced web site to “empower consumers” and net income increases are prevalent.  
JPMorgan Chase clearly used press releases to stress the company was still successful 
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and was helping consumers and communities throughout the United States in order to 
respond to the actional legitimacy needs (TARP and paying bonuses) and institutional 
legitimacy questions raised by the media. 
First, the theme of helping communities and having a responsibility to customers 
is a clear focus of many of the press releases from 2009.  One such example is in a press 
release from September 22, 2009, which went in depth as to how over the past nine 
months, JPMorgan Chase had raised $90 billion for local governments, non-profits, 
healthcare companies, universities, and state governments by providing loans to improve 
social services, build bridges and parks, train young individuals for jobs, and expand 
hospitals and medical research funding (JPMorgan Chase, 2009c).  This is not a direct 
legitimacy appeal by JPMorgan Chase about receiving TARP funding or paying 
employee bonuses.  Rather, this seems to be an attempt to rebuild institutional legitimacy 
by highlighting how JPMorgan Chase was involved in the community and how it was 
helping local businesses, hospitals, and non-profits.  Todd Maclin, Chase Commercial 
Bank CEO, was quoted as saying, “From the time our country faced its toughest moments 
in the financial crisis, we have been dedicated to local governments and the organizations 
at the heart of our communities that Americans have come to depend on” (JPMorgan 
Chase, 2009c).  Then, a detailed list of JPMorgan Chase’s “safe and sound lending” 
demonstrated how JPMorgan Chase had been helping others.  This list included: $62 
billion for state and local governments, $11 billion for healthcare organizations, $15 
billion for educational organizations, and $1.6 billion for other non-profit groups.  This 
theme of helping communities, demonstrating the stability of JPMorgan Chase, the 
ability of the bank to raise capital, and its concern for others in the aftermath of the 
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financial crisis, all emerge as key themes from the press releases issued by JPMorgan 
Chase during 2009.  Again, this appears to be a response by JPMorgan Chase to increase 
its institutional legitimacy and to push some of the issues that emerged from the financial 
crisis (e.g., trustworthiness, transparency, stability) from critical to current or imminent in 
the lifecycle of issues.  By highlighting how JPMorgan Chase is involved in 
communities, able to raise capital, and to raise this capital to help others is an institutional 
legitimacy response as opposed to an actional legitimacy response supporting the policies 
of repaying TARP and paying executive bonuses.    
The second theme in these press releases is success.  JPMorgan Chase regularly 
pointed to its increasing quarterly incomes and highlighted many successes to indicate it 
was a vibrant, sturdy, dependable bank.  For example, on June 17, JPMorgan Chase 
repaid its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds in full, which totaled $25 billion.  
JPMorgan Chase wrote in its press release that, “In addition to this principal amount, 
JPMorgan Chase has paid the U.S. Treasury an aggregate of $795,138,889 in dividends 
on the preferred stock” (JPMorgan Chase, 2009b), further sharing with stakeholders this 
theme of success, and even a hint of responsibility on the part of JPMorgan Chase.  By 
highlighting success and repayment of TARP, JPMorgan Chase responded to the actional 
legitimacy needs of repaying TARP as identified by The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal.  It also afforded JPMorgan Chase the opportunity to highlight its 
institutional legitimacy, which was necessary after the 2008 financial crisis.  
Stability also emerged as a theme within JPMorgan Chase’s press releases that 
allowed it to respond to the institutional legitimacy issues it faced.  As an exemplar, on 
March 31, 2009, JPMorgan Chase won 15 industry awards, including “Best Trade 
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Services Provider,” “Most Innovative Trade Bank,” “Best Structured Trade Finance 
Bank,” and 7 “Deals of the Year” (JPMorgan Chase, 2009a).  Within this press release, 
Melissa Moore, chief executive officer of JPMorgan Chase’s Treasury Services states, 
“With so much uncertainty and volatility in the global economy, clients have been 
seeking the kind of stability and strength that JPMorgan Chase delivers…While the 
markets are challenging, we remain dedicated to helping and supporting our clients” 
(JPMorgan Chase, 2009a).  While discussing stability did not allow JPMorgan Chase to 
respond to the concerns raised by the media, it did help it rebuild its institutional 
legitimacy by emphasizing its stability following the financial crisis.   
 By providing funds to community members and supporting consumers as they 
moved forward through the mortgage crisis and slumping economy, JPMorgan Chase 
tried to legitimize its actions.  JPMorgan Chase’s actions were an attempt to reflect the 
public values of community involvement, success, and stability in the months 
immediately following the financial crisis.  JPMorgan Chase was able to respond to a 
legitimation crisis by continually demonstrating to shareholders through the discourse of 
its press releases that JPMorgan Chase’s values were congruent with the values of the 
American public, of its shareholders, of its stakeholders, and of its key publics.  As 
evidenced by these three themes, JPMorgan Chase’s discourse from its press releases did 
not directly respond to the concerns raised within the mass media.  Rather, JPMorgan 
Chase tried to rebuild institutional legitimacy by highlighting its community service and 
ongoing stability throughout the financial crisis.  JPMorgan Chase did not often directly 
respond to the actions requiring legitimation (the repayment of TARP and paying 
executives year-end bonuses).  Rather, by highlighting these themes, JPMorgan Chase 
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tried to re-legitimate the institution as a whole.  This might not have been the best 
strategy for JPMorgan Chase to use.  However, stressing stability and success does have 
its upside: while other banks (e.g., Bank of America and Wells Fargo) struggled to 
survive 2009, JPMorgan Chase could discursively emerge as the leader of the financial 
sector.   
 
4.1.3 2009 Annual Report 
Within the 2009 Annual Report, JPMorgan Chase worked to rebuild its 
institutional legitimacy while ignoring the actional legitimacy questions raised regarding 
its executive bonus pay and TARP repayment. The 2009 Annual Report was titled, “The 
Way Forward.” The title alone provides an interesting starting point to the analysis of this 
document.  JPMorgan Chase used a vague slogan, which seems to suggest that it was 
helping the United States find its way out of the mortgage crisis; in a subtle way, this 
might have sent a message to its internal publics that JPMorgan was vibrant and leading 
the way forward within the financial sector (e.g., JPMorgan Chase employees).  This 
report also matched an advertisement series run throughout 2009 by JPMorgan Chase.  
JPMorgan Chase began the annual report by saying, 
At JPMorgan Chase, we’re focused on doing our part to lead the way forward 
during these difficult times.  While we continue to face challenges in the financial 
systems in the United States and around the world, we maintain a fortress balance 
sheet and are well-positioned for the future.  We are confident that we will 
continue to reinvest in our businesses for the benefit of our stakeholders, as we do 
48 
 
the right thing for our consumers and for the communities we serve.  (The way 
forward, 2009) 
JPMorgan Chase struck a confident tone, stressing their stability with their “fortress 
balance sheet,” maintaining that it was “well-position[ed] for the future.” It also 
attempted to bolster its shareholders’ trust in the bank’s future ability to succeed when it 
stated JPMorgan Chase will “do the right thing for our consumers and for the 
communities [it] serve[s].”  This focused mainly on JPMorgan Chase’s institutional 
legitimacy as it addressed questions as to the bank’s future success and stability.  By 
pointing to its long-term stability and using wording like “fortress balance sheet,” 
JPMorgan Chase attempted to lower the status of the issue of stability raised by the 
financial crisis.  This did not respond, however, to the actional legitimacy issues 
regarding executive bonuses or the repayment of TARP that was in the media throughout 
2009.  
 Further in the annual report, JPMorgan Chase tried to demonstrate transparency as 
another way to rebuild its institutional legitimacy and lower the status of the issues raised 
by the 2008 financial crisis.  It provided a blow-by-blow account of the mortgage crisis in 
the United States, and attempted to address the concerns of shareholders saying, “we 
were the only bank willing to commit to lend $4 billion to the state of California, $2 
billion to the state of New Jersey and $1 billion to the state of Illinois” (The way forward, 
2009).  This claim by JPMorgan Chase not only allowed an accessible way for 
shareholders to read how JPMorgan Chase supported other states and was compassionate, 
but it also provided the opportunity for JPMorgan Chase to high its ability to remain 
stable in an ever-changing, tumultuous environment.  JPMorgan Chase tried to emphasize 
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its uniqueness as a banking institution.  The annual report went on, stating, 
“Additionally—and, frequently, when no one else would—we loaned or raised for our 
clients $1.3 trillion, providing more than $100 billion to local governments, 
municipalities, schools, hospitals, and not-for-profits over the course of 2009” (The way 
forward, 2009).  By stressing transparency, JPMorgan Chase tried to alleviate shareholder 
and stakeholder concerns that the financial crisis raised (e.g., the secrecy of sub-prime 
mortgages, derivatives, and mortgage-backed securities leading to a major economic 
downturn) and bolster its overall institutional legitimacy.  While this could help rebuild 
institutional legitimacy and shareholder/stakeholder trust in JPMorgan Chase, it still does 
not address the actional legitimacy issues raised in The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal about JPMorgan Chase’s executive bonus policies or its acceptance and 
repayment of TARP loans. 
 Sprinkled throughout the letter were other mentions of how JPMorgan Chase 
helped “our people—JPMorgan Chase’s most valuable asset,” how it supported financial 
reform, how its responsibility would lead to America’s success, and “what we actually do 
as a bank to serve our clients and customers and what we did to respond to the crisis and 
help the communities in which we operate” (The way forward, 2009).  The tone of the 
annual letter was clear, and an attempt at transparency, along with some phrases that 
allowed for various groups to derive meaning in different ways (e.g., “The Way 
Forward”).  This allowed JPMorgan Chase to mitigate the concerns and address the 
issues many of their key publics felt were of utmost importance; namely, trust and 
stability.  These themes are similar to the themes that emerged from JPMorgan Chase’s 
press releases, and they do not address the actional legitimacy issues identified by the 
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mass media—executive bonuses and TARP repayment.  Rather, by stressing it was an 
industry leader, a transparent company, and a stable bank, JPMorgan Chase repeatedly 
attempted to rebuild institutional legitimacy by highlighting these themes.   
 
4.1.4 Annual Letter to Shareholders  
The 2009 letter to shareholders was another opportunity for JPMorgan Chase to 
craft its narrative to rebuild institutional or actional legitimacy regarding TARP and 
executive bonuses.  However, this letter to shareholders, written by JPMorgan Chase 
CEO Jamie Dimon, was used primarily to rebuild institutional legitimacy and ignored the 
policies needing actional legitimacy.  The letter struck a similar tone to JPMorgan 
Chase’s annual report and similar themes concerning the stability of JPMorgan Chase 
throughout the mortgage crisis and the trustworthiness of the bank emerged.  For 
example, Dimon wrote, “The past two years have been among the most extraordinary and 
challenging in recent history for JPMorgan Chase, the financial services industry and the 
global economy” (Dimon, 2009).  This willingness of JPMorgan Chase to address head-
on the issues of global consumers indicated a willingness to be transparent.  Dimon also 
struck a tone of “all for one and one for all,” when he wrote about the panic “we felt a 
year ago.” He discussed lost jobs, a sustained economic crisis, and how the past two years 
(2008 and 2009), had been “part of a challenging, yet defining, decade” (Dimon, 2009).  
This seems to be an attempt by Dimon to rebuild institutional legitimacy.  By using its 
annual letter to discuss in detail the hardships that both JPMorgan Chase and its 
shareholders experienced, it appears that Dimon was conveying the value of transparency 
to shareholders and stakeholders.  This is a way to rebuild trust in the institution, decrease 
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the status of the issues raised by the financial crisis, and bolster its overall institutional 
legitimacy.    
The second theme of stability emerged as the letter then shifted to a more 
aggressive tone when Dimon wrote, “our strategic position is clear, and JPMorgan Chase 
is a leader in all of its businesses” (Dimon, 2009).  Dimon focused on the stability of 
JPMorgan Chase by touching on how JPMorgan Chase stock went up 70%, when, by 
comparison, the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index was down 9% over the same period 
(Dimon, 2009).  The emergence of the discursive theme of stability allowed for Dimon to 
rebuild institutional legitimacy.  Stressing the bank’s stability by highlighting JPMorgan 
Chase’s leadership in the financial sector, JPMorgan Chase is able to begin rebuilding 
institutional legitimacy.  This also allowed JPMorgan Chase the opportunity to explain 
why the actions it took were wise and effective.  By shifting to a more aggressive tone in 
his letter, Dimon stressed JPMorgan Chase’s success and stability to bolster its 
institutional legitimacy.  However, this theme still falls short in responding to the need for 
legitimacy regarding the repayment of TARP and how JPMorgan Chase doled out 
executive bonuses.   
Finally, the discursive themes of stability and trust helped rebuild JPMorgan 
Chase’s institutional legitimacy,.  These themes are used throughout Dimon’s letter to 
shareholders.  For example, he touched on how a “sense of responsibility” allowed 
JPMorgan Chase, despite the difficult economic times all banks and individuals were 
experiencing, to “move beyond the distractions of the moment and stay focused on what 
really matters: taking care of our clients, helping the communities in which we operate 
and protecting our company” (Dimon, 2009).  Yet again, Dimon touched on the money 
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lent to states, to municipalities, schools, and hospitals.  He also pointed to JPMorgan 
Chase’s $70 billion loan in the global interbank market “when it was needed the most” 
(Dimon, 2009).  Dimon promoted this theme of trustworthiness throughout the letter, 
which allowed the shareholder to feel as if JPMorgan Chase really was looking out for 
his/her best interests, despite the trying financial times many were experiencing.  This 
helped rebuild JPMorgan Chase’s institutional legitimacy while still ignoring the issues 
of executive bonuses and the repayment of TARP.  Dimon concluded the letter by saying, 
Your company continues to do everything it can, in every community in which we 
work, to help the world recover as quickly as possible.  In 2009, as they have so 
many times before, our people rose to the challenge, working amid tremendous 
uncertainty in a fragile economic and political environment.  They have also 
coped with the anger directed toward the financial services industry.  Through it 
all, they did not lose focus on why we are all here: to serve our clients and, 
therefore, our communities around the world.  (Dimon, 2009)  
In managing these issues of long-term trust in JPMorgan Chase and the perceived 
stability of the bank, JPMorgan Chase discursively positioned itself as one of the 
foremost leaders in the financial services industry without having to respond to the 
actions needing legitimacy as highlighted by the media (e.g., the repayment of TARP and 
paying large bonuses to executives).  Dimon especially was praised as one of the top 
banking CEOs in the world, and was thought to have carefully, wisely, and artfully 
steered JPMorgan Chase out of the crisis (Craig & Silver-Greenberg, 2013b).  JPMorgan 
Chase was able to use its publications and communication with shareholders, 
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stakeholders, and key publics to address and mitigate these issues of perceived 
trustworthiness and stability.   
While the statements of JPMorgan Chase did not specifically address the policies 
raised by the mass media as needing actional legitimacy (repaying TARP, paying 
executives bonuses), JPMorgan Chase focused instead on addressing the institutional 
legitimacy issues it faced after the 2008 financial crisis.  By focusing on the rhetorical 
themes of trust, stability, and success, JPMorgan Chase could directly confront the issues 
raised by the financial crisis, emerging from 2009 in a better position than Bank of 
America and Wells Fargo.  For practitioners, this underscores the need for discourse and 
campaigns that focus on the issues raised by the public, and not values advocacy 
campaigns that highlight positive areas of agreement with key publics (e.g., community 
involvement, charitable giving, or environmental practices).   
 
4.2 Bank of America 
4.2.1 Press Coverage 
Within the print media’s coverage of Bank of America and the post-financial 
crisis coverage of the bank, several themes reoccurred throughout 2009 that required 
actional and institutional legitimacy from Bank of America.  Examining policies 
highlighted by the news media (both The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal) 
allows for identification of particular banking policies for which Bank of America had to 
regain actional legitimacy.  Bank of America struggled much more for its actual survival 
than JPMorgan Chase.  As a result, it appears that The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal also focused on Bank of America’s need to regain institutional legitimacy.  
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The news coverage revealed two policies as needing actional legitimacy (the Bank of 
America/Merrill Lynch merger and the payment of executive bonuses) and one ongoing 
question as to Bank of America’s institutional legitimacy (e.g., the ongoing survival and 
stability of Bank of America).   
 First, in early 2009, Bank of America merged with Merrill Lynch, raising actional 
legitimacy concerns within the media.  It came to Congress and the public’s attention that 
large compensation bonuses were doled out days before Merrill Lynch merged with Bank 
of America.  Then taxpayer money (in the form of TARP funds) was pumped directly into 
Bank of America to help shore up the books after the merger went through.  Initially, Ken 
Lewis was criticized as “overpaying” for Merrill Lynch (Sanger, 2009).  However, in late 
January the Office of the Attorney General announced it was investigating $4 billion in 
bonus payments made by Merrill Lynch to its employees before the deal closed.  It is also 
examined “what Bank of America’s chief administrative officer, J.  Steele Alphin, [and 
others] knew about the payments” (Sanger, 2009).  As a result, this led to more scrutiny 
of many of Bank of America’s key players and raised questions as to the actional 
legitimacy of the merger.  In fact, the merger (and the scrutiny after the merger) led to 
shareholder lawsuits against Bank of America and fueled a shareholder initiative that 
meant Ken Lewis lost his seat as chairman of Bank of America (Story & Becker, 2009a).  
This was a major change that required actional legitimacy for Bank of America.  
Especially as Ken Lewis lost his seat as chairman of Bank of America (splitting the 
traditional chairman/CEO roles), it appeared that shareholders were declaring Bank of 
America’s action of acquiring Merrill Lynch and potentially paying out year-end bonuses 
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to Merrill Lynch executives as unacceptable.  It could also indicate a lack of trust or 
confidence in Ken Lewis’s leadership of Bank of America.  
 The questions over Bank of America’s actional legitimacy regarding its 
acquisition of Merrill Lynch continued to the point where the SEC accused Bank of 
America of ignoring its duty to shareholders and required actional legitimacy in regards 
to Bank of America’s bonus policy in 2009 (Story & Becker 2009b).   The SEC’s 
accusations resulted in Bank of America’s payment of $33 million to settle the SEC’s 
claims without having to admit one way or the other about the accusations.  The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal’s coverage of this actional legitimacy crisis 
makes it clear that this was a major issue within the media throughout 2009 as Bank of 
America’s agreement with the SEC was viewed as “unlikely to put to rest questions 
swirling around Bank of America and its leadership” (Kouwe, 2009a).  A month later, 
subpoenas were sent to board members as the Attorney General looked into what role the 
Bank of America board played in deciding how much information to reveal to 
shareholders prior to the Merrill Lynch/Bank of America merger (Kouwe, 2009b).  This 
was a major issue that kept Bank of America in the news for several months, and called 
into question its actions during the Merrill Lynch merger.  As the payment of executive 
bonuses was such a major question in regards to the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch 
merger, the year-end executive bonus payment required actional legitimacy from Bank of 
America to legitimate its policy of paying executives.    
 Second, The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal raised questions over 
Bank of America’s institutional legitimacy as the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch merger 
seemed to leave Bank of America weak.  As early as January 15, The New York Times 
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reported that Bank of America was in negotiations for a second round of federal funds.  It 
was already granted $25 billion in capital from the initial round of TARP funding, but had 
to ask for more aid as it acquired Merrill Lynch (Segal & Cowan, 2009).  The New York 
Times reported, “It was not that long ago that Bank of America was viewed as a pillar in 
the banking sector.  But in recent months, its stock has plummeted as investors worried it 
has acquired companies with their own set of financial baggage” (Segal & Cowan, 2009).  
On January 26, Bank of America was called, alongside Citigroup, one of the nation’s 
most quickly deteriorating banks (Sanger, 2009).  Bank of America’s former chairman 
and chief executive Hugh McColl, Jr., called the acquisition of Merrill Lynch 
“disappointing” in The Wall Street Journal (Fitzpatrick, 2009b) and Bank of America’s 
stock plummeted (Browning, 2009).  In fact, it was suggested that Bank of America and 
Citigroup emerged as losers of the financial crisis (Eavis, 2009), and Bank of America 
CEO Ken Lewis argued in an editorial that Bank of America had become a scapegoat for 
bailouts and bonuses (Lewis, 2009).  From the media and outspoken critics, Bank of 
America faced institutional legitimacy concerns regarding its stability and survival in 
2009.  The question of whether Bank of America could recover from its merger required 
some sort of response by Bank of America in order to regain its institutional legitimacy.   
 As a result of this media coverage, Bank of America was not just suffering several 
individual questions of actional legitimation; it was also suffering from a crisis of 
institutional legitimation.  The legitimacy and survival of the entire bank was on the line, 
and so it was not just the actions of Bank of America that raised concerns (e.g., the 
payout of bonuses to Merrill Lynch executives days before a merger and Bank of 
America’s executive bonus policy), but rather the institution’s legitimacy (e.g., could 
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Bank of America regain its footing on Wall Street).  This required Bank of America to not 
only try to re-legitimize its actions, but also to try to re-legitimize the entire bank.   
 
4.2.2 Press Releases  
Bank of America's press releases do not have themes as clearly emphasized as 
some of JPMorgan Chase's press releases (e.g., “The Way Forward”).  However, three 
themes from Bank of America's public discourse—specifically, the themes of regular 
charitable contributions throughout 2009, a focus on helping troubled homeowners, and 
an emphasis on community events—did emerge that focused mainly on rebuilding Bank 
of America’s institutional legitimacy (e.g., Bank of America’s charitable contributions 
and its community engagement) and ignored the specific controversies identified by the 
media as needing actional legitimacy (e.g., year end bonuses and merging with Merrill 
Lynch at the end of 2008).   
First, the theme of focusing on charitable contributions in order to bolster its 
institutional legitimacy was prevalent throughout Bank of America's 2009 press releases.  
Several times throughout 2009, Bank of America announced it would donate a sum of 
money for a neighborhood, relief efforts, or charitable organizations.  For example, on 
July 7, 2009, Bank of America pledged $5,000 for every recorded hit at an MLB All-Star 
Game to benefit Feeding America.  Additionally, Bank of America pledged to match all 
fan donations up to $100,000.  On September 3, 2009, Bank of America donated $50,000 
to California fire relief efforts.  Then, on September 30, Bank of America contributed 
$50,000 to the American Red Cross to aid victims of severe storms and flooding.  In the 
press release, Bank of America used the donation as an opportunity to underscore both 
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their volunteerism and charitable contributions.  This allowed Bank of America to appear 
engaged in the community, but also to highlight that it was stable enough after the 
financial crisis to remain involved in the community and continue to pledge money to 
various causes.  As a result, Bank of America was able use this discursive theme to 
respond to its institutional legitimacy problems it faced in order to begin downgrading the 
status of the issue of its stability from critical to current or imminent.  Bank of America 
also touched on how it works with communities and neighborhoods, saying,   
Building on a long-standing tradition of investing in the communities it serves, 
Bank of America this year embarked on a new, ten-year goal to donate $2 billion 
to nonprofit organizations engaged in improving the health and vitality of their 
neighborhoods.  Funded by Bank of America, the Bank of America Charitable 
Foundation gave more than $200 million in 2008, making the bank the most 
generous financial institution in the world and the second largest donor of all U.S. 
corporations in cash contributions.  Bank of America approaches investing 
through a national strategy called "neighborhood excellence" under which it 
works with local leaders to identify and meet the most pressing needs of 
individual communities.  (Bank of America, 2009b) 
Within this press release, Bank of America boasted more than 900,000 volunteer hours in 
2008 designed to “enhance the quality of life in their communities nationwide” on the 
part of their bank executives and bank associates (Bank of America, 2009b).  Again, this 
seemed to be a way Bank of America could better present itself in a way that garnered 
institutional legitimacy.  By pointing to volunteerism, past donations, and highlighting a 
new goal of donating $2 billion to nonprofits within the next ten years, Bank of America 
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was able to not only highlight its good deeds, but also focus on how it helps neighbors 
and homeowners.  However, focusing on charitable contributions did not respond to the 
actional legitimacy questions raised within The New York Times and The Wall Street 
Journal about the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch merger, allowing this issue to remain at 
a critical (or crisis) level and in the news.  This clear discrepancy between Bank of 
America’s discourse and its legitimation needs indicates a potential shortcoming in Bank 
of America’s public discourse.    
 Second, Bank of America's press releases highlighted how it helped troubled 
homeowners.  This was an action that Bank of America used in an attempt to regain 
actional legitimacy for its mortgage practices, but this was not an action raised by the 
media as needing legitimation.  For example, on March 5, Bank of America's press 
release highlighted a new alliance for stabilizing communities that was specifically 
targeted for maintaining home ownership among multicultural households.  On April 9, 
Bank of America announced it began to refinance mortgages under the U.S. Treasury's 
“making homes affordable” plan, which allowed homeowners with little to no equity to 
refinance their homes.  This is a particularly interesting theme as it seemed to provide 
Bank of America with a way to partially regain actional legitimacy with regards to its 
mortgage business, since trading mortgage-backed securities and making faulty loans are 
part of the reason the Financial Crisis came about in the first place.  However, this is not 
one of the actions raised within the media as needing legitimation.  Rather, this seemed to 
be a policy that initially contributed to the 2008 financial crisis.  By highlighting its 
mortgage business, Bank of America does try to rebuild its actional legitimacy, just not 
the actional legitimacy concerns raised in the media.  This is certainly an unusual 
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response on Bank of America’s part as this response does not seem to address the actional 
legitimacy issues so that they might be reduced in status from critical to current or 
imminent.  For example, when Bank of America announced it surpassed its goal of 
helping at least 125,000 financially distressed homeowners, the press release emphasized 
how Bank of America was among the first lenders to offer refinancing under the Home 
Affordable Refinance Program, refinancing approximately 95,000 home mortgages 
(Bank of America, 2009c).  This emphasis on restructuring mortgages and helping 
thousands of homeowners is certainly worth scrutiny as it more directly responds to the 
questions of actional legitimacy raised by the financial crisis and seems to be an attempt 
to regain and retain actional legitimacy for an organizational policy that is not in the 
limelight.   
 Third, Bank of America emphasized its community engagement as a way to 
rebuild its institutional legitimacy. The bank promoted several events including 
marathons, baseball games, and neighborhood excellence initiatives throughout 2009.  
This was an attempt to regain institutional legitimacy as it focuses on the community and 
giving back to the community and did not highlight either of the policies (the Merrill 
Lynch merger or paying executives bonuses) requiring actional legitimacy as identified 
by the media.  However, by portraying Bank of America as a friendlier, more community-
minded bank, Bank of America may have tried to regain institutional legitimacy as it 
struggled with questions as to its stability and survival in 2009.  By highlighting its 
community involvement and engagement, Bank of America can present itself as a vibrant 
and active bank, not as a bank struggling to repay its TARP loan.  For example, on May 
27, Bank of America announced a new program to help municipalities purchase bank-
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owned properties.  This is a way in which the negatives of the Financial Crisis—the bank 
takeover of mortgages that homeowners and neighborhoods could no longer afford—
were repainted as Bank of America helping these communities regain their footing.  
Again, this highlights the bank’s stability as Bank of America looked to regain 
institutional legitimacy.  There were also mentions of community events, such as the 
Bank of America Chicago Marathon in June 2009, and promotions for St. Louis 
Cardinals fans.  Perhaps most importantly, on January 13, Bank of America announced 
the launch of the sixth year of nationally recognized neighborhood excellence initiative, 
which “addresses a nonprofit leadership deficit through strategic leadership 
training...which is unprecedented during these economic times” (Bank of America, 
2009a).  This is yet another way in which Bank of America showed its stability 
(continuing a program despite the economic hardships of the previous year) while still 
giving back to the community.  It seems that by focusing on neighborhoods and local 
communities, Bank of America was trying to regain institutional legitimacy even as it 
ignored the actions of paying executive bonuses and the Merrill Lynch acquisition that 
needed legitimation.   
 From the 2009 press releases, Bank of America’s discourse focused on its 
institutional legitimacy by highlighting its charitable contributions and community 
engagement.  Despite the clear need for the legitimation of its merger with Merrill Lynch 
and its year end executive bonus policy as presented in the media, Bank of America chose 
instead to focus on the restructuring of mortgages as its action to highlight.  While Bank 
of America did respond to some of its institutional legitimacy needs by highlighting its 
continued charitable giving and community engagement despite the economic hardships 
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of the recession, it did not respond to the actions identified by The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal as needing actional legitimation.  However, Bank of America did 
highlight its action of revising its mortgage-lending policies and helping refinance home 
mortgages.  This seemed to be more of a direct response to the financial crisis in general 
rather than its specific media coverage.       
 
4.2.3 2009 Annual Report 
Bank of America’s annual report did not touch on the Merrill Lynch merger and 
the payment of year-end bonuses to executives.  While these two actions needed actional 
legitimacy by Bank of America, Bank of America chose instead to highlight the action of 
repaying TARP.  The other policy Bank of America highlighted—its revised mortgage 
policies—also was used to garner actional legitimacy regarding mortgage lending, but 
Bank of America failed to address the actions of acquiring Merrill Lynch and paying 
year-end bonuses to executives when addressing its actional legitimation needs.  Rather, 
Bank of America’s annual report highlighted its ongoing stability and community 
engagement (in response to its institutional legitimation needs) and, unlike its press 
releases, highlighted its transparency and clarity in its banking practices in order to 
bolster its overall institutional legitimacy.    
First, Bank of America addressed its actional legitimacy concerning mortgage 
lending practices in the annual report.  Again, this was not an action highlighted by the 
media as needing legitimacy, but rather was an action Bank of America highlighted 
repeatedly to legitimate.  This may have been an attempt to decrease the status of this 
issue as raised by the financial crisis from critical to current or imminent.  This report 
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started with an interesting question for stakeholders.  Written from a shareholder 
perspective, the annual report asked, “Dear Bank of America, I have a stake in this 
company too.  What are you doing to move the bank and the economy forward” (Bank of 
America annual report, 2009)? The following page listed 22 questions including, “Times 
are tough.  What is Bank of America doing to help?,” “Can Bank of America do more for 
me than my hometown community bank?,” and “I'm in over my head with my mortgage.  
How can you help?” The third page, in bold letters is a response from Bank of America.  
It answered, “We're listening.  We know your financial needs are changing.  That's why 
we're changing, too...” Bank of America's stakeholders and shareholders were told Bank 
of America was working for them, and was experiencing the same financial hardships 
they were.  On top of that, Bank of America said it was adapting to the current economic 
climate, just like its shareholders and stakeholders had to adjust following the financial 
crisis.  Once again, Bank of America highlighted its revised mortgage lending practices 
and emphasized that it was changing in an attempt to garner actional legitimation for its 
mortgage lending policies.  However, this is an actional legitimation need that was more 
relevant to the 2008 annual report rather than the 2009 annual report.  Mortgage lending 
practices seemed to no longer be of concern to the media.  Year-end bonuses were of 
much more concern to the news media, as was the action of Bank of America allowing 
the payment of year-end bonuses to executives at Merrill Lynch mere days before it 
acquired Merrill Lynch to prevent Merrill Lynch’s bankruptcy.  There was a clear 
disconnect between the actions the news media raised as questions (requiring legitimation 
from Bank of America) and the actions for which Bank of America seemed to have tried 
to increase actional legitimacy.  Actional relegitimation was targeted when the annual 
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report discussed Bank of America helping homeowners with their mortgages and revising 
its lending practices.  This meant Bank of America did not respond to the actions the 
media raised as needing legitimation. 
The second way Bank of America responded to certain actions needing legitimacy 
was when it discussed the specifics of the repayment of TARP.  This is an actional 
legitimacy response as the news media was concerned with all three banks’ repayment of 
TARP funding.  However, TARP was only briefly touched upon early in the annual report 
and was not discussed further throughout the assessment of Bank of America’s health.  
Moreover, the repayment of TARP only emerged in the news media late in 2009 as The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal remarked that Bank of America was finally 
repaying its TARP loan (it was one of the last banks to do so).  Rather, there was a focus 
on Bank of America’s institutional legitimacy as highlighted by demonstrating the 
stability of the bank and its involvement in the community. The Merrill Lynch merger 
was only discussed briefly and was only painted in a positive light, further creating a 
chasm between the media’s coverage of Bank of America and Bank of America’s 
rhetoric.  However, Bank of America did repeatedly highlight its ongoing stability and 
success, and even made somewhat of an attempt at organizational transparency when 
discussing its new, “easier” banking that “helps families in tough times” and “help[s] 
customers save.” As Bank of America struggled to survive in 2009 and emerged from the 
financial crisis as a “loser,” its refusal to address issues brought forth by the media could 
have impeded its performance.      
Bank of America also used its annual report to help rebuild its institutional 
legitimacy.  Throughout the course of the annual report, Bank of America listed the ways 
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it was “making banking better,” including being clear and easy to understand, helping 
families in tough times, making every good loan possible, providing advice that helps its 
clients plan for it all, delivering customized solutions wherever its clients needed, and 
working hard to keep its communities vibrant in response to its institutional legitimation 
needs.  By highlighting its stability, (e.g., it continued to help clients and communities 
despite the economic downturn), Bank of America tried to garner more institutional 
legitimacy.  Bank of America listed 14 actions it had taken over the previous year to 
prove it was making banking “better.” These 14 themes again were in response to the 
institutional legitimation needs of Bank of America.  The themes included helping 
customers save, supporting small businesses, and its philanthropic giving.  Some of these 
actions match up with the themes to come out of its 2009 press releases, like the 
emphasis on neighborhood and community giving.  These are themes that stress Bank of 
America’s ongoing stability and engagement within the community, yet do not 
correspond to the basic question raised within the news media as to whether or not Bank 
of America could recover from the Merrill Lynch/Bank of America merger.  By ignoring 
this need for actional legitimacy regarding the merger, Bank of America was risking its 
overall institutional legitimacy by letting this issue remain critical instead of trying to 
decrease its status within the lifecycle of issues.    
 
4.2.4 Annual Letter to Shareholders  
In the 2009 letter to shareholders, Bank of America and CEO Brian Moynihan 
addressed both institutional and actional legitimation needs.  Specifically, Moynihan tried 
to garner institutional legitimation by discussing its ongoing stability despite a hefty 
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financial loss in 2009; Moynihan also responded to Bank of America’s actional 
legitimation needs regarding its actions during the financial crisis, the payment of year-
end bonuses, and modifying home mortgages.  I will first highlight the theme Moynihan 
used to rebuild institutional legitimacy (Bank of America’s stability), and then discuss the 
two discursive themes Moynihan used to address the actional legitimacy concerns raised 
in the media.  
First, this letter to shareholders made an effort to regain its institutional legitimacy 
in the face of a tough year financially as Bank of America lost the CEO that led it through 
the financial crisis.  Written by the new CEO and president, Brian Moynihan, (on 
September 30, Ken Lewis, CEO and president throughout the financial crisis, announced 
his retirement effective Dec.  31, 2009) this letter stressed that it was a tough and difficult 
year “by almost every measure.” Moynihan reported that the net loss applicable to 
common shareholders was a loss of $0.29 per diluted share, or $2.2 billion.  However, 
immediately after announcing this loss, the letter to shareholders went into a discussion 
concerning the repayment of TARP, perhaps as a way to legitimize the actions of Bank of 
America (and its financial performance in 2009).  The letter also highlighted that the 
bank “came through the worst year for banks in several generations with net income up 
more than 50% over 2008.” This is another way in which Bank of America, while having 
to report a loss to shareholders, was able to show its stability in order to regain 
institutional legitimacy.   
 However, this letter to shareholders responded differently than Bank of America’s 
press releases and annual report by more directly responding to questions concerning its 
actional legitimacy, both those actions raised by the media, and those raised by the 2008 
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financial crisis.   In direct response to a loss of actional legitimacy, Moynihan highlighted 
Bank of America's leadership through the Financial Crisis (although not as explicitly as 
JPMorgan's “The Way Forward” campaign and themes highlighting its leadership and 
strength).  Rather, Bank of America wrote, 
Early in this crisis, it became clear that consumers across all our markets were 
frustrated with their banking experience.  They wanted clarity, consistency, 
transparency and simplicity in their financial products and services. (Moynihan, 
2009) 
Bank of America then discussed its actions like a “clarity commitment” in all its 
documents regarding home loans and credit card businesses that explain “in plain 
English” the terms of the services rendered.  And, perhaps most importantly to regain 
actional legitimacy, Bank of America wrote, “we're working with policy leaders on 
reforms for derivatives trading, securitization and other sectors that aim to improve 
transparency and accountability” (Moynihan, 2009).  These actions seem to be a direct 
response to a loss of actional legitimacy and an attempt to decrease the status of this issue 
from critical to current or imminent.  After the financial crisis, as people felt like Bank of 
America was misleading or deceptive, the bank took these actions to address it and try to 
restore legitimacy.  This seemed to be the most obvious (of all the banks examined in this 
thesis) discourse where a bank tried to regain shareholder and stakeholder trust by 
changing and/or advocating for changes in the banking policies that lead to the financial 
crisis in the first place.  However, it could have also been just a nod to policymakers who 
were upset with banks proceeding with a business-as-usual mindset.  As policymakers in 
Washington discussed stricter banking regulations, this rhetorical move may have been 
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strategic in an attempt by Bank of America to avoid stricter regulations while also trying 
to regain shareholder and stakeholder trust.  Or, as this is Moynihan’s first letter to 
shareholders, this could have been a deliberate attempt to gain the trust of Bank of 
America’s shareholders to rebuild the relationship between the shareholders and the CEO.  
As Lewis left Bank of America, it was clear he had lost shareholder trust and his actions 
were not deemed legitimate by shareholders when they voted to revoke Lewis’s position 
as chairman of Bank of America, splitting the traditional chairman/CEO positions.  
Despite this clear response to a lack of actional legitimacy, Bank of America still failed to 
address the actional legitimation issues raised in the media of acquiring Merrill Lynch 
and paying year-end bonuses to executives.  
 However, in a second way to address the actional legitimacy needs of Bank of 
America, Moynihan finally responded to the policies regarding executive compensation 
and bonuses, which was an action that both The Wall Street Journal and The New York 
Times repeatedly discussed as an issue lacking legitimacy with both the media and the 
American public.  Moynihan wrote, “While we have always had a 'pay for performance' 
culture, we have made important changes to our compensation practices to more closely 
align pay with long-term financial performance and enable the company to recover funds 
when risks go bad” (Moynihan, 2009).  This seemed to be the most explicit way in which 
any of the banks examined in this analysis attempted to address the questions of actional 
legitimacy put forth by the press and the American public.  The letter also discussed the 
new and improved approaches to risk management employed by Bank of America, 
stating, “Before and during the crisis, many of our collective business judgments missed 
the mark.  We believe the changes we're making now will put us in a much better position 
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to see and respond to macroeconomic risks in the future.” This is the first time that Bank 
of America’s rhetoric seemed to directly address the actional legitimacy concerns of 
paying year-end bonuses as raised by the media.  However, as Moynihan was just starting 
his tenure at Bank of America and Lewis was just leaving, this may have been 
Moynihan’s attempt to distinguish himself from Lewis or change Bank of America’s 
message to shareholders and stakeholders.  This is something that is difficult to know for 
sure, but it does raise interesting questions as to this shift in Bank of America’s rhetoric.   
 The third action Moynihan discussed in an attempt to regain legitimacy was how 
Bank of America was engaged with the community by modifying loans for homeowners.  
The letter concluded with a section discussing how Bank of America must grow “in the 
right way.”  This section highlighted both community engagement and, again, modifying 
loans for homeowners.  Modifying loans and mortgages is a theme that emerged from 
three separate documents and was a clear attempt to regain actional legitimacy for 
mortgage lending practices.  Moynihan wrote, “There is nothing more important to our 
more than 280,000 Bank of America teammates and me than our belief that there's a right 
way to do business—an approach that balances our responsibilities to all our 
stakeholders.” This was important because it spoke to both internal and external publics, 
especially by aligning Moynihan's interests with the interests of his employees.  The 
letter also touched on small- and medium-sized businesses, highlighting how Bank of 
America lent $16 billion to these businesses, and would increase that lending by another 
$5 billion in 2010.  And Bank of America highlighted how it had improved the process of 
loan modifications, modifying nearly 700,000 mortgages since January 2008.  This is a 
way in which Bank of America tried to connect with shareholders and stakeholders in 
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order to better legitimize its actions leading to the Financial Crisis and its recovery and 
loss of profits.  However, as mentioned previously, this action is not one raised by The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal as needing actional legitimacy.  Since it 
emerged from three different sets of public documents, it is clear that Bank of America 
felt it necessary to repeatedly stress its revised mortgage practices.  Whether a nod to 
policymakers or shareholders and stakeholders, this was an action that Bank of America 
repeatedly tried to garner legitimacy for but was not necessarily high on the media’s 
radar.  Throughout the majority of Bank of America’s rhetoric in 2009, it stresses actions 
and examples of institutional legitimacy that did not match up with the actions identified 
in the media as needing legitimation.   
As Bank of America emerged from 2009 weak and struggled to repay its TARP 
loans by the year’s end, the question of whether Bank of America adequately responded 
to its legitimation crisis is a valid one.  I argue that despite financial performance, a more 
calculated and strategic issues management campaign might have helped Bank of 
America’s performance in the media and might have helped it avoid some of the media 
scrutiny of its merger with Merrill Lynch.  Also, by failing to address the Merrill Lynch 
merger head-on, this seemed to create an ongoing issue that was not properly 
downgraded in status by Bank of America.  So while Bank of America did finally address 
some of the actional legitimation concerns raised by The New York Times and The Wall 
Street Journal in 2009, there were many shortcomings that may have caused Bank of 
America to deal with additional struggles as it was unable to reduce the status of the 
issues raised in the media as needing actional legitimacy, namely the Merrill Lynch/Bank 
of America merger, from critical to current or imminent.  This caused Bank of America to 
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deal with a cycle of negative news media which, in turn, continued to hurt its institutional 
legitimacy.   
 
4.3 Wells Fargo 
4.3.1 Press Coverage 
Wells Fargo’s press coverage emerged as different from JPMorgan Chase and 
Bank of America.  Wells Fargo often seemed to be an afterthought in many of the news 
articles in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.  Despite how Wells Fargo 
was portrayed in these articles, two major issues for Wells Fargo emerged: it was 
considered the bank that was most involved in racial discrimination in providing 
subprime mortgages and it was criticized for calling for the deregulation of executive 
bonuses despite its inability to repay its TARP loans.  This generated negative press 
coverage for Wells Fargo, which was not helpful in light of its purchase of Wachovia for 
$12.68 billion (Fitzpatrick, 2009a).  This made it difficult for Wells Fargo as it started 
2009 at a financial disadvantage, much like Bank of America.  Wells Fargo either needed 
to explain why its racially-linked policies were justifiable, or it needed to change its 
image related to race by gaining legitimacy for new race-neutral or diversity-focused 
initiatives.   
 On June 7, The New York Times reported that a lawsuit accused Wells Fargo of 
steering blacks to subprime mortgages more frequently than, for example, white 
customers.  Two previous Wells Fargo employees provided accounts of their actions, 
which were damning.  Jacobson, one of the loan officers who provided an affidavit, said 
that as a loan officer, she was directed to deliberately steer borrowers of color into 
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subprime mortgages (Powell, 2009).  The city of Baltimore sued Wells Fargo, saying the 
toll of these policies was terrible.  Baltimore released data that provided evidence that 
more than half the properties subject to foreclosure on a Wells Fargo loan from 2005 to 
2008 stood vacant, and 71% of these were in predominately black neighborhoods 
(Powell, 2009).  The same article argued that in a recent analysis of mortgage lending in 
New York City, black households making more than $68,000/year were nearly 5 times as 
likely to hold high-interest subprime mortgages as whites of similar or even lower 
incomes.  This disparity was greater for Wells Fargo borrowers, as 2% of whites in that 
income group hold subprime loans and 16.1% of blacks hold subprime loans (Powell, 
2009).  The director of the Washington office of the Center for Responsible Lending said, 
“We've known that African-Americans and Latinos are getting subprime loans while 
whites of the same credit profile are getting the lower-cost loans…The question has been 
why, and the gory details of this complaint may provide an answer” (Powell, 2009).  This 
painted Wells Fargo in a terrible light, and three months later, Wells Fargo was still in the 
news in regards to the financial crisis’s racial divide (Russell, 2009).   
The second action that required legitimacy was Wells Fargo’s calls for the 
deregulation of executive pay.  It pushed for the deregulation of executive pay despite its 
inability to pay back its TARP loan and financially perform.  As a result, The New York 
Times and The Wall Street Journal repeatedly called Wells Fargo’s actional legitimacy 
regarding executive bonus pay and the repayment of TARP into question. 
 While allegations of racist lending practices were flying, Wells Fargo also 
struggled with its institutional legitimacy in the media.  Wells Fargo found itself with a 
downgraded rating from Standard and Poor’s (Labaton, 2009) and Moody’s (Grace, 
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2009).  Then, on August 5, Fuller (2009) reported that Wells Fargo was failing to reach 
large numbers of eligible borrowers, and had only modified 6% of existing loans based 
on loan revision policies proposed by the Obama administration and Congress.  
Consequently, Wells Fargo was suffering from a crisis of institutional legitimation.  Not 
only did its practice of providing subprime mortgages to African Americans and Latinos 
cause uproar in The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, but it was unable to 
respond to calls for loan reformation.  It was the last among the large banks to repay its 
TARP bailout funds (Cooper & Dash, 2009), and it failed a stress test as regulators called 
for Wells Fargo to raise more capital (Gullapalli, 2009; “Maybe it’s not so bad”, 2009).  
Wells Fargo’s stock struggled despite its best efforts in the media to appear strong.  For 
example, on April 15, Wells Fargo announced that it was in good financial shape and 
expected a $3 billion quarterly profit.  However, this statement was frustrating for 
Treasury officials who said it would be more difficult for them to issue negative 
assessments of Wells Fargo in light of this self-declaration of good health (Sanger & 
Dash, 2009).   
On top of all this, an editorial criticized banks like Wells Fargo that were using 
taxpayer bailout money to take out full-page advertisements in newspapers despite the 
perceived extravagance of this act, which could have cost up to $200,000 (Dowd, 2009).  
Clearly Wells Fargo’s actional legitimation needs were hurting its reputation (it needed to 
justify or adjust its racial profiling in mortgage lending and either repay its TARP loans 
or stop calling for the deregulation of executive pay), and its institutional legitimacy 
needs called into question its survival (Wells Fargo, for example, needed to raise more 
capital).  Wells Fargo’s actions were perceived as illegitimate.  These actions did not 
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meet or mirror the values and expectations of the American public.  Wells Fargo was 
fighting for not only its actional legitimacy with regards to its lending practices, but also 
for its institutional survival.   
 
4.3.2 Press Releases  
Wells Fargo’s press releases revealed two major discursive themes, and several press 
releases highlighted concerns that the media and American public had, as highlighted 
within the press coverage of Wells Fargo.  I will first discuss how Wells Fargo addressed 
two actional legitimacy concerns raised in the media, and then discuss the two discursive 
themes Wells Fargo uses to attempt to rebuild institutional legitimacy throughout 2009.   
First, Wells Fargo responded to concerns within the media about its actional 
legitimacy related to its calls for the deregulation of executive bonuses despite its 
inability to repay TARP loans.  In order to address these concerns, Wells Fargo was 
careful about releasing statements about the repayment of TARP and different policies 
Wells Fargo had—specifically about the payout of year-end bonuses.  For example, Wells 
Fargo released the 2009 quarterly earnings reports and announced the repayment of 
$312.5 million dividends to U.S. taxpayers in response to the need to legitimate its action 
of taking the TARP loan from the U.S. government.  This was a way for Wells Fargo to 
respond to the media’s actional legitimacy concerns that Wells Fargo had yet to repay all 
its TARP funding.  As a result, Wells Fargo highlighted its payment of, for example, 
dividends in an attempt to respond to questions of why Wells Fargo had yet to repay 
TARP.    
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Second, the announcement of year-end bonuses was handled delicately by Wells 
Fargo.  In an attempt to legitimize the actions of providing bonuses to its chief 
executives, Wells Fargo said the following: 
These retention performance shares, which are not a form of cash compensation or 
annual incentive bonus, are forfeited if the executive receiving the shares leaves the 
Company to work for a competitor.  In addition, the retention performance shares 
provide an incentive for these executives to achieve continued extraordinary results 
for the Company.  The shares will vest after three years of service only if the 
company meets specified performance goals, and are subsequently covered by Wells 
Fargo’s long-standing policy that a portion of all shares earned by executives as 
compensation must be held for as long as they remain employed by the company.  For 
2009, these executives will not receive annual cash incentive bonuses.   
(Wells Fargo, 2009i)  
This seems to be a very careful and detailed explanation by Wells Fargo, and its method 
of paying bonuses was different than JPMorgan Chase’s and Bank of America’s methods.  
Also, by highlighting specific changes to this policy, Wells Fargo could potentially begin 
to use issue management to lower this issue from a critical issue to a current or imminent 
issue.  Additionally, Wells Fargo announced that it would only give three of its chief 
executives these “retention performance shares.” It seemed to be a response to the outcry 
within the media about the payout of executive bonuses.  Of note, Wells Fargo was the 
only company to release the transcriptions of its House and Senate hearings throughout 
2009.  This may also have been in response to its actional legitimation needs for 
transparency and disclosure after the financial crisis.   
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 Outside the responses within Wells Fargo’s press releases to actional legitimacy 
concerns, two discursive themes emerged that are in response to Wells Fargo’s 
institutional legitimation needs.  Specifically, Wells Fargo highlighted its practice of 
lending money to small businesses and diverse companies and its environmental/“green” 
efforts.   
First, Wells Fargo’s lending practices were highlighted throughout 2009.  For 
example, on May 14, Wells Fargo Asian Business Services announced it reached its 10-
year goal to lend $3 billion to Asian business owners nationwide three years ahead of 
schedule.  This was released “in celebration of Asian Pacific American Heritage Month,” 
and Wells Fargo expanded the goal to $5 billion by the end of 2013 (Wells Fargo, 
2009e).  A November 5 press release revealed that Wells Fargo was America’s #1 small 
business lender, as a Wells Fargo official stated, “We’re helping refuel America’s 
economic engine—one small business loan at a time.” Wells Fargo also reported an 
overall 5% increase in nonprofit giving and released a report on its 2008 community 
investments on April 8.  Wells Fargo reported $6.4 billion in community development 
loans and investments for affordable housing, schools, economic development, 
community revitalization, and job creation, 1.4 million “team member volunteer hours” 
in the community, $45.8 million in grants to nonprofit housing organizations and the 
establishment of a grant to fund energy-efficient, green affordable homes, and $942 
million spent with diverse-owned and women-owned suppliers (Wells Fargo, 2009d).  
Finally, Wells Fargo boasted of being the number one small-business lender, loaning 
more than $38 billion to women, African American, Latino, and Asian business owners 
since 2005 (Wells Fargo, 2009b).  While the media focused on the institutional 
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legitimacy needs of Wells Fargo’s downgraded ratings and need to raise more capital, 
Wells Fargo instead chose to focus more on its community involvement as a way to 
highlight its stability.  However, this is not just a response to Wells Fargo’s questioned 
strength and stability.  Rather, by highlighting its stability and ongoing involvement with 
ethnically diverse businesses, Wells Fargo indirectly responded to the actional legitimacy 
concern of why Wells Fargo discriminated based on race in lending subprime mortgages.  
This is a response that did not directly respond to the media coverage.  An indirect, yet 
strategic campaign to highlight its diverse lending practices did not seem to help Wells 
Fargo as its subprime mortgage lending and racial discrimination stayed in the news 
cycle for most of 2009.  Consequently, there may be lessons for practitioners to take from 
Wells Fargo’s experiences when dealing with actional legitimacy crises as this case 
suggests the need to directly address actional legitimacy issues.  
 Second, Wells Fargo’s press releases clearly designated it as a “green” company.  
This was a way to highlight Wells Fargo’s institutional legitimacy.  Not only did Wells 
Fargo repeatedly highlight its actions to reduce environmental and energy waste, but it 
also invested money in environmentally-focused companies, and tried to help small 
businesses with green practices.  For example, on September 25, Newsweek ranked Wells 
Fargo as “the greenest bank in the U.S.” (Wells Fargo, 2009g).  On November 17, Wells 
Fargo announced a donation of $41.9 million to nonprofits in annual community support 
and the United Way Campaign.  Wells Fargo also boasted it was the company’s “most 
green campaign to date with nearly 100% of all pledges made online and the elimination 
of nearly all print marketing materials” (Wells Fargo, 2009h).  On October 14, Wells 
Fargo announced it was going to reduce its U.S.-based greenhouse gas emissions by 20%.  
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And in a bridging of both themes the company highlighted throughout 2009 as it 
attempted to regain shareholder and stakeholder trust, Wells Fargo announced that it had 
financed 125 commercial-scale solar photovoltaic projects since the fall of 2007.  Wells 
Fargo stated, “Despite the economic downturn, Wells Fargo continues to help customers 
secure reliable, cost-effective power and help businesses access cleaner energy 
sources…We look forward to helping the industry expand even further” (Wells Fargo, 
2009c).  This is a way that Wells Fargo highlighted its ongoing stability and even success 
in a year of bad news coverage for Wells Fargo.  Throughout 2009, Wells Fargo also 
announced small policy changes, including a changeover during its United Way 
campaign to online-only donations within the company, and a policy that negated the 
need to use envelopes to deposit cash and checks at Wells Fargo ATMs.  In fact, Wells 
Fargo estimated it had already saved over 6,000 trees through the change, winning the #4 
Innovative Company by Information Week 500 (Wells Fargo, 2009f).  So while Wells 
Fargo faced harsh critics in the print media that called into question its survival, 
downgraded credit ratings, and its need to raise more capital, Wells Fargo repeatedly 
pointed to the success of its company in a values advocacy-driven strategic campaign that 
highlighted Wells Fargo’s green practices and concern for the environment.  This is not a 
direct response to the institutional legitimacy concerns raised by The New York Times and 
The Wall Street Journal.  However, by having successes to point out through the use of 
its environmental policies, Wells Fargo could argue it was still a strong and vibrant bank.  
Additionally, as a large percentage of Wells Fargo’s press releases focused on its 
environmental conservation awards, this may have been a deliberate effort to shift the 
ongoing narrative in the news cycles.  While it may not have been the most effective 
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strategic communication move, it did allow Wells Fargo the ability to point to its success 
and innovation in 2009.   
 
4.3.3 2009 Annual Report 
In its 2009 Annual Report, Wells Fargo used the theme, “The Vision that Works” 
as a way to rebuild institutional legitimacy.  In the annual report, Wells Fargo wrote, “Our 
vision is clear and simple.  We want to satisfy all our customers’ financial needs and help 
them succeed financially” (Wells Fargo annual report, 2009).  The report then used 
pictures and stories throughout the beginning to highlight Wells Fargo’s personal touch.  
The first story was about Hanh Nguyen, a teller in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.  It briefly 
explained how Nguyen asked her customer about how much she was a paying in auto 
insurance after handing her customer her banking statement.  The report states, “Together, 
they called a Wells Fargo Insurance agent.  An hour later, the customer saved $400 a year 
in premiums.  Then she decided to check our renter’s insurance, too, and on the same call 
saved even more money” (Wells Fargo annual report, 2009).  This mini-narrative 
highlighted how Wells Fargo made one customer’s life “simpler for her.” The second 
narrative tells how an Illinois customer was on wellsfargo.com and was able to live chat 
with a loan specialist, Jamie Berthiaume.  Berthiaume writes, “Customers like it.  They 
like that they can get a fast answer and that they’re talking to a real person” (Wells Fargo 
annual report, 2009).  This narrative highlighted how customers can get personalized 
mortgage and loan services, even online.  A total of 12 narratives underscores the 
company’s personalized, community-based approaches to lending and how it moved 
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quickly to help its customers.  At the end of these narratives, in bright colors and bold 
letters, Wells Fargo wrote,  
We’re not just a bank that happens to be in a community.  We’re a community 
bank.  That means we’re “in and of” every community in which we do business.  
We were local first, then national.  We weren’t born as a national bank that 
decided to be local.  We were born as a local bank in one community that grew to 
be national.  Here’s how a vision should work…for our communities.  (Wells 
Fargo annual report, 2009) 
The report then used four more narratives, including pictures, bolded quotes, and 
charts, about how Wells Fargo invested in local communities.  The report then discussed 
at length the financial performance of the company, and included financial statements, 
quarterly financial data, and loan portfolios.  Wells Fargo’s slogan, “Together we’ll go 
far,” was interspersed throughout the report.  It appeared the main focus of the annual 
report was how Wells Fargo repeatedly stressed through its marketing and narratives how 
it was a community bank and it focused on the customer.  This could be a way in which 
Wells Fargo attempted to rebuild stakeholder and shareholder trust, especially when it 
says, “We weren’t born as a national bank that decided to be local.  We were born as a 
local bank in one community that grew to be national” (Wells Fargo annual report, 2009).   
This annual report and its use of narratives was a way for Wells Fargo to regain 
institutional legitimacy.  This occurred in three ways.  First, by using the theme “A Vision 
That Works,” Wells Fargo was able to craft a discourse where it is succeeding financially 
because its vision “works.” This underscored its stability and success, even if these two 
things were called into question by the media.  Second, by highlighting a diverse group of 
81 
 
Wells Fargo customers in the narratives, Wells Fargo was able to indirectly respond to the 
actional legitimacy concern that it racially discriminated.  Third, rhetoric like “together, 
we’ll go far” allowed Wells Fargo to again highlight its hope for the future and its 
ongoing stability.  This allowed Wells Fargo to highlight its strength and stability while 
responding to institutional legitimation needs and subtly respond to the actional 
legitimacy concern of why Wells Fargo racially discriminated.   
However, Wells Fargo’s annual report did not directly address some of the major 
actional concerns raised in the media, like how it was unable to repay its TARP loans or 
how it called for the deregulation of executive pay.  Additionally, it did not address the 
institutional legitimacy concerns raised by its credit downgrade or its need to raise more 
capital.  As a result, while Wells Fargo does craft an annual report that has a clear 
rhetorical theme, this theme falls short of assuring shareholders and stakeholders that 
Wells Fargo is addressing these legitimation needs.   
 
4.3.4 Annual Letter to Shareholders  
In his letter to shareholders, John Stumpf, Chairman, President, and CEO of Wells 
Fargo, touched on four different actions and policies that required legitimation.  
Specifically, Stumpf discussed Wells Fargo’s lending practices, its ability to provide loans 
to small businesses, the repayment of its TARP loans, and too big to fail.  These four 
actions and policies were in direct response to the legitimation concerns raised by The 
New York Times and The Wall Street Journal.   
First, Stumpf discussed the first two actions requiring legitimacy—Wells Fargo’s 
lending practices and its loaning money to small businesses.  He touched on how Wells 
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Fargo was a responsible lender, taking money invested in Wells Fargo to invest in 
“people, businesses and construction for creating and building things that help America’s 
economy grow and that strengthen neighborhoods and communities” (Stumpf, 2009).  
Wells Fargo’s action of providing $711 billion in loans and lines of credit to customers 
and providing more loans to small businesses than any other U.S. lender allowed Stumpf 
to address the actional legitimacy concerns raised by the media in regards to Wells 
Fargo’s racial discrimination in subprime mortgage lending.  While Stumpf did not 
explicitly address these concerns, by touching on the number of loans provided to 
customers in 2009 and highlighting how Wells Fargo provided more loans to small 
businesses than any other U.S. bank, Wells Fargo attempted to address its unsavory 
mortgage lending.  These are the first two ways that Wells Fargo tried to respond to the 
media’s actional legitimacy concerns regarding its mortgage practices and discrimination.  
Critics may argue that this low mortgage delinquency rate was a result of Wells Fargo’s 
racially discriminatory practices as many of its subprime mortgages could have been 
bought up by the U.S. government at this point in 2009, and left Wells Fargo with less 
urban and less racially diverse mortgages.  So while Wells Fargo used this metric as a 
sign of its successful revision of mortgage lending practices, it really calls into question if 
Wells Fargo had actually adjusted its racial discrimination in mortgage lending.   
Third, the repayment to the U.S. Treasury by raising over $33 billion in 14 
months (in regards to TARP and the repayment of $1.4 billion in dividends) were 
highlighted as evidence of Wells Fargo’s responsible business practices and how it 
invested in neighborhoods and communities.  This was the first time that Wells Fargo 
addressed the repayment of TARP, which was one of the actions that The New York Times 
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and The Wall Street Journal questioned as Wells Fargo called for the deregulation of 
executive pay.  This was of concern since, if Wells Fargo was unable to repay TARP loans 
by the end of 2009, executive bonuses would come from taxpayer bailout funds.  Wells 
Fargo “maintained a mortgage delinquency rate, including foreclosures, a third of the 
industry average, with 92 of every 100 of our mortgage customers current on their home 
payments” (Stumpf, 2009). 
 Finally, Wells Fargo discussed in more detail than JPMorgan Chase and Wells 
Fargo the financial crisis.  Interestingly, Stumpf discussed “too big to fail” outright.  He 
wrote, “We believe no company should be ‘too big to fail.’ A government ‘resolution 
authority’ should unwind and liquidate any failed company.  It shouldn’t be just 
bankruptcy or ‘bail out.’ What’s needed is a mechanism to assure the orderly winding 
down of a failed company…” (Stumpf, 2009).  He then stated,  
Wells Fargo is large, but we’re also broadly diversified.  We have controls and 
practices that enable us to manage risk.  It’s simple to solve the problem of “too 
big to fail.” Let’s just make it clear: any financial services firm can be allowed to 
fail.  If it fails to manage its risk, it deserves to fail.  Period.  (Stumpf, 2009) 
This is shocking that a bank that accepted TARP funds spoke this explicitly against “too 
big to fail.” However, it is a way for Wells Fargo to regain actional legitimacy in regards 
to its lending practices.  Within the media, all three banks—JP Morgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo—took heat for the financial risks, subprime mortgage lending, 
and economic downturn within the U.S.  By publicly declaring that banks should not be 
“too big to fail,” and by repeatedly highlighting its community engagement, service, and 
focus on local and small businesses, Wells Fargo could regain shareholder and 
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stakeholder legitimacy.  Additionally, as Wells Fargo called for the deregulation of 
executive pay, this may have been a calculated, strategic move to appease policymakers 
in Washington, D.C. who were fed up with Wall Street.  Jamie Dimon was considered 
Obama’s “favorite banker,” so the fact that both Bank of America and Wells Fargo made 
some type of mention concerning policy to appease lawmakers may be an attempt by 
other large banks on Wall Street to gain the favor of the president or Congress.  
Regardless of the reasons why this was included, it still falls short of the mark: not once 
did Wells Fargo explicitly address the major actional legitimacy question it faced as to 
why it racially discriminated in regards to subprime mortgage lending.  Wells Fargo was 
unable to justify why it adhered to these policies and did not explicitly change its 
mortgage lending standards and policies.  As a result, while Wells Fargo did use the 
annual letter to shareholders as an opportunity to regain actional legitimacy regarding its 
credit practices, loans to small businesses, the repayment of TARP, and too big to fail, it 
did not adequately address one of the largest actional legitimacy crises of all three of 
these banks (JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo).   
 
4.4 Analysis of Research Questions 
After analyzing in depth the rhetoric JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells 
Fargo used throughout 2009 in their press releases, annual reports, and annual letters to 
shareholders and comparing this rhetoric with the actional and institutional legitimacy 
concerns raised by The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, it is worthwhile to 




1a: How do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo use legitimacy to lower 
the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
 As evidenced throughout much of the analysis, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo all used legitimacy in an attempt to lower the status of issues 
facing them from critical to current or imminent.  However, some of these banks more 
effectively used legitimacy than others.  For example, Wells Fargo did not directly 
confront the legitimacy concerns raised in the media.  Whether Wells Fargo’s 
performance suffered because of this or not is difficult to say.  However, by not directly 
confronting questions of its actional legitimacy regarding, for example, its racial 
discrimination in subprime mortgage lending, Wells Fargo was unable to lower the status 
of this issue from critical to current (or imminent) very quickly.  Rather, Wells Fargo was 
forced to deal with this issue remaining in the news cycle for much of 2009.   
 Conversely, Bank of America more explicitly took on the issue of year-end 
bonuses raised by the media in 2009.  Within the media, Bank of America was criticized 
for acquiring Merrill Lynch and potentially paying out year-end bonuses to Merrill Lynch 
executives mere days before publicly announcing the merger.  Having been accused of 
“ignoring its duty to shareholders,” Bank of America explicitly addressed the actional 
legitimacy concern of year-end bonuses in its letter to shareholders.  This was a more 
direct way to deal with this actional legitimacy concern.  However, it was too little too 
late as the Merrill Lynch merger had been in the news cycle for much of 2009 and the 
letter to shareholders came out in late 2009.   
 In summary, while legitimacy was used to help lower the status of issues from 
critical to current or imminent, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo all 
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needed to consider more explicitly addressing the legitimacy issues raised by the media 
to more quickly reduce the lifecycle of some of these issues.   
 
1b: How do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo use narratives to lower 
the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
 JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America did not use narratives to lower the status 
of issues facing them from critical to current or imminent.  However, Wells Fargo’s 
annual report extensively used narratives to lower the status of issues from critical to 
current or imminent.  For example, Wells Fargo was critiqued for ignoring its duty to 
shareholders.  By using narratives of its shareholders to illustrate how Wells Fargo was 
better serving its customers, it was able to begin building institutional legitimacy.  These 
narratives allowed Wells Fargo to develop more of a persona and allowed it to highlight 
its stability and success.  Moreover, by using narratives, Wells Fargo is able to address 
the actional legitimation of mortgage lending practices, even though this was not an 
action raised by the media as needing legitimation.  Rather, these narratives helped Wells 
Fargo better respond to some of the issues that emerged because of the financial crisis 
(e.g., trust and transparency) and humanize itself after aiding in a massive economic 
downturn.  However, by failing to use these narratives to address the major actional 
legitimation concern of racially discriminating in its subprime mortgage lending, Wells 





1c: What rhetorical strategies do JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
use to lower the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or imminent?  
 JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo each use specific rhetorical 
strategies to lower the status of issues facing the banks from critical to current or 
imminent.  Each bank used strategies that included values advocacy, strategic ambiguity, 
legitimacy-bolstering rhetoric, and redefinition.  These strategies functioned to distance 
JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo from some of the gaps in legitimacy 
they experienced in 2009.  However, some of these banks better addressed the concerns 
raised by the media than others.  For example, JPMorgan Chase was perhaps most direct 
about the repayment of TARP and did not have as negative media coverage concerns 
policies needing actional legitimation (e.g., paying bonuses) as banks like Wells Fargo 
(that tried to push for deregulation of executive bonuses).  As a result, JPMorgan Chase 
was the most strategic in its rhetoric, which allowed it to not only continue its positive 
media coverage, but to also emerge rhetorically as the bank that could lead “The Way 
Forward.” JPMorgan Chase’s rhetoric between its press releases, annual report, and 
annual letter to shareholders seemed the most coordinated which, again, allowed it to 
emerge from 2009 appearing to be stable and well position for the future.  This is a 
strategy that both Bank of America and Wells Fargo may have benefited from using.   
While Bank of America used similar rhetorical strategies as JPMorgan Chase, it 
focused on actional legitimacy concerns not raised by the media in 2009 such as its 
mortgage-lending policies, which was effective when looking at the financial crisis as a 
whole, but did not aid in helping Bank of America reduced the level of issues like the 
paying of year-end bonuses or acquiring Merrill Lynch from critical to current or 
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imminent.  Rather, Bank of America’s lack of a rhetorical strategy seemed to keep issues 
like the Bank of America/Merrill Lynch merger at the critical (or “crisis”) level.   
Finally, Wells Fargo, who emerged the weakest from the financial crisis, used 
rhetorical strategies similar to JPMorgan Chase and Bank of America, but seemed to 
ignore the biggest actional legitimacy issue facing it: racial discrimination in subprime 
mortgage lending.  Much like Bank of America, by failing to directly address this issue, 
Wells Fargo allowed questions and allegations concerning its actions to fly throughout 
much of 2009.  Instead of actively using rhetoric to reduce the status of this issue from 
critical to current or imminent, Wells Fargo allowed its actional legitimacy regarding 
mortgage lending to go questioned in the media for much of 2009, which ultimately 
could have led to its mediocre financial performance.    
 
2a:  Are there themes that emerge in the financial public relations used by JPMorgan 
Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo?  
 There are very specific themes that seem to emerge from the discourse used 
across all three banks.  For example, the themes of stability, success, and community 
involvement/giving are all themes that each bank used.  A table is included to highlight 








Table 4.1 Thematic Summary 
JPMorgan Chase Bank of America Wells Fargo 
• Success 
• Stability 
• Helping communities 





• Charitable giving 





• Green efforts 




2b: How do the themes used by JPMorgan Chase compare to its quarterly financial 
reports (including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009? 
 The themes used by JPMorgan Chase compare to its quarterly financial reports, 
including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share in 2009 in an interesting 
way, but it is difficult to draw conclusions or causations based on this data.  Refer to 
Appendix A for a quarter-by-quarter financial performance for JPMorgan Chase, and also 
for the specific themes that emerge from the press releases announcing each quarter’s 
financial performance.  There do not seem to be any clear themes based on the quarter 
and the financial performance of JPMorgan Chase.  Additionally, Appendix A compares 
JPMorgan Chase’s reputation (from the annual Forbes/The Reputation Institute survey) at 
the end of 2009 to 2010 and 2012.  There do not seem to be any clear trends that emerge 
from this data, either.  
 There are a few reasons why it is difficult to know for sure if there are any 
potential relationships between the rhetoric JPMorgan Chase used in 2009 and its 
financial performance.  Essentially, there is too much noise that prevents researchers and 
outside observers from knowing for sure if the rhetoric JPMorgan Chase used in one 
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specific quarter had any impact.  Some of this noise includes (but is not limited to): 
economic cycles, media reports, global or domestic economic downturns, the Federal 
Reserve’s daily forecasts, and political climate.  All these factors contribute to the 
inability to know for sure if there are relationships between what JPMorgan Chase said 
and if that positively or negatively impacted its financial performance for the quarter and 
for the year.  However, it is still interesting to review the quarterly discourse and the 
quarterly financial performance and it provides some potential areas for future research to 
better determine what, if any, relationship exists between economic performance and the 
rhetoric of financial institutions.   
 
2c: How do the themes used by Bank of America compare to its quarterly financial 
reports (including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009?  
 Please refer to the response to RQ 2b.  Appendix B compares Bank of America’s 
quarterly performance and reputation.  
 
2d: How do the themes used by Wells Fargo compare to its quarterly financial reports 
(including stock performance, cash on hand, and market share) in 2009?  
 Please refer to the response to RQ 2b.  Appendix C compares Wells Fargo’s 
quarterly performance and reputation.  
91 
 
CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
This project studied the intersections of financial public relations, image restoration, 
and legitimacy.  Specifically, this study explored how the rhetorical strategies used to 
communicate  organizational legitimacy, trust, and stability following the 2008 financial 
crisis compared to questions of legitimacy as raised by the news media.  The rhetoric 
disseminated to key stakeholders, shareholders, and interested publics via press releases, 
annual reports, and letters to stakeholders was explored in an attempt to recreate the 
image restoration process each bank underwent.  From this study, three key findings 
emerged that contribute to the literature and two lessons for practitioners are identified.  
Finally, this chapter will discuss future directions in regards to the study of financial 
public relations and image restoration.   
 
5.1 Theoretical and Practical Implications 
First, the cases of Bank of America, and Wells Fargo seem to indicate that 
actional legitimacy may lead to better press coverage.  For example, Bank of America’s 
merger with Merrill Lynch led to an outcry in the media about the payout of bonuses to 
Merrill Lynch executives days before its merger with Bank of America.  This merger 
prevented Merrill Lynch from failing, which raised the question as to why Merrill Lynch 





knew this action happened.  By refusing to use its press releases, annual reports, and 
letters to shareholders to either explain the rationale for this action or adjust its year-end 
bonus policy, Bank of America was unable to decrease the status of this issue from 
critical to current or imminent.  As a result, the Merrill Lynch merger remained in the 
media for the majority of 2009.  A similar situation happened with Wells Fargo when it 
did not provide a rationale or publicly adjust its policies regarding racial discrimination 
with subprime mortgage lending.  Wells Fargo remained under fire by the media for this 
action.  Both these banks remained in a cycle of negative press coverage because these 
issues were still crises and still received extensive media coverage.  Thus, it may be that 
actional legitimacy helps prevent a crisis and can lead to more positive press coverage 
overall.   
Second, the literature acknowledges that actional legitimacy helps prevent an 
issue from becoming critical (a crisis).  However, it seems that engaging in actional 
legitimation also helps push an issue through the lifecycle faster.  For example, Wells 
Fargo did not respond or justify why it used discriminatory practices in its subprime 
mortgage lending.  By not justifying or publicly adjusting its action, this issue remained 
critical and in the news media for much of 2009.  In contrast, Bank of America used its 
letter to shareholders to publicly adjust its policy of year-end bonus payouts.  This helped 
Bank of America downgrade this policy that needed legitimation from a critical issue to 
an imminent issue by changing the rhetoric surrounding the policy: no longer did Bank of 
America issue sweeping executive bonuses.  Rather, it shifted to a policy that allowed it 
to recuperate these bonuses when executives took risks that went bad.  Consequently, this 





addressing actions and policies that need legitimation, organizations can push an issue 
through the lifecycle more quickly.   
Third, the cases of JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo 
underscore the need for public relations campaigns that are not values advocacy driven 
(e.g., highlight the charitable contributions organizations make or shifts to eco-friendly 
policies) but rather campaigns that confront issues head on.  JPMorgan Chase repeatedly 
addressed issues concerning its institutional legitimacy (e.g., stability, trustworthiness, 
success) within its press releases, annual report, and letter to shareholders.  JPMorgan 
Chase emerged from 2009 as one of the strongest banks on Wall Street.  Wells Fargo, on 
the other hand, spent much of its press releases, annual report, and letter to shareholders 
highlighting its small business lending and its “green” efforts.  Wells Fargo emerged 
from 2009 as one of the weakest banks on Wall Street.  Failing to address its institutional 
legitimation needs (e.g., its downgraded ratings from S&P and Moody’s and its inability 
to repay TARP) and its actional legitimacy needs, (e.g., racial discrimination in subprime 
mortgage lending), Wells Fargo emerged from 2009 with a weak image despite 
highlighting values it held in common with the public (e.g., “green” policies).    
This study addresses how financial public relations, image restoration, and 
legitimacy intersect.  Exploring how the communication of financial information can 
impact an organization’s legitimacy and image helped contribute to the literature of 
financial public relations, an area that is understudied yet important as conveying 
financial information can have major economic implications and the mismanagement of 
financial information can put financial public relations specialists and other executives in 





of these big Wall Street banks were deemed socially irresponsible, thereby threatening 
their institutional legitimacy.  Some of these banks also took specific steps to respond to 
the actions identified by the media as illegitimate in order to regain both actional and 
institutional legitimacy.  As a result, this study contributes to the literature in these fields 
and also provides two practical implications for practitioners.   
First, the case of Bank of America and its merger with Merrill Lynch underscores 
the importance for practitioners to confront issues head-on.  By failing to directly respond 
to the media and public’s legitimation concerns, an issue turned into a full, year-long 
crisis for Bank of America.  This was an issue that could have easily been downgraded in 
the lifecycle of issues.  However, being ignored by Bank of America enabled it to 
become critical.  Despite its financial performance and struggles, a more calculated and 
strategic issues management campaign might have helped Bank of America’s 
performance in the media and might have helped it avoid some of the media scrutiny of 
its merger with Merrill Lynch.  This seems to underscore how values advocacy 
campaigns fall short in restoring legitimacy and helping downgrade issues in the lifecycle 
of issues.  Rather, values advocacy may be more important in garnering support from key 
publics, shareholders, and stakeholders before an issue arises. For instance, if an 
organization has used values advocacy to establish value premises before a crisis 
(Bostdorff & Vibbert, 1994), then during a crisis, key publics may be more likely to 
support that company.  For instance, Johnson & Johnson uses values advocacy campaigns 
to demonstrate its commitment to families. Its tagline, “Johnson & Johnson, a family 
company” and the family themes of its commercials repeatedly showcase how it values 





this commitment to valuing families could allow Johnson & Johnson to avoid losing a 
key public while dealing with a crisis.  This phenomenon can also be observed with 
sports stars like Lance Armstrong.  As Lance Armstrong stood as the face of LiveStrong 
and represented the battle with cancer, he faced allegations of doping in the Tour de 
France.  Until Armstrong released a public statement saying he would no longer fight 
these allegations, his supporters and key publics continued to support him and his brand.  
Once he released that public statement, a mass exodus of donors, sponsors, and key 
publics left LiveStrong and Lance Armstrong.  This could be another area in which this 
argument may hold true.    
Second, JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo’s individual cases 
all highlight the need for public relations practitioners to hold a seat at the management 
table.  Studies underscore the importance of the public relations function to management 
(e.g., Gaunt & Ollenburger, 1995; Grunig, Grunig, and Dozier, 2002).  However, when 
dealing with financial institutions or the conveyance of financial information, issues can 
become critical much more quickly as financial performance, stock performance, and the 
status of the overall economy can all be at stake.  As a result, it is important that public 
relations practitioners and financial public relations practitioners have a seat at the table 
to help chief executives and managers make decisions not only before a financial issue 
arises, but in the aftermath of a major crisis like the 2008 financial crisis.  By confronting 
major issues directly and helping craft the organization’s discourse, corporate 
communication professionals with decision-making power may be able to help their 





5.2 Future Directions 
This project raises several questions important to the future study of this topic.  
Financial public relations remains important in the field of communication as the 
conveyance of financial information can impact organizational performance, the overall 
economy, or even the overall global economy.  Also, understanding how financial 
organizations regain legitimacy following an economic downturn or crisis is important as 
the possibility for another financial crisis exists and a lack of confidence in financial 
institutions can have serious global repercussions.  Consequently, four areas for future 
research have promise.   
First, the use of orientational metaphors in financial public relations is an area for 
future research.  For example, JPMorgan Chase repeatedly used “the way forward” 
throughout its discourse.  The way forward is part of the orientational metaphor 
“JPMorgan Chase is forward.”  In this metaphor family, up (forward) refers to having 
control and down (backward) refers to being subject to control.  It may be worthwhile to 
examine how the orientational metaphor was used in regards to bailout funds and 
governmental regulation.  As banks push for deregulation, this orientational metaphor 
may emerge.  Examining the use of the orientational metaphor among various financial 
institutions may provide some insight as to how these institutions can regain and lose 
legitimacy.  Second, the role of the CEO is worth exploring further.  For example, Bank 
of America’s CEO Ken Lewis left Bank of America after shareholders voted to split his 
role as CEO and chairman.  Jamie Dimon, on the other hand, was celebrated as a strong 
CEO who was able to successfully steer JPMorgan Chase through the financial crisis.  





organization’s legitimacy may prove a rich area for future research.  Third, how 
organizations frame financial information may prove interesting.  Furthermore, the 
impact of framing financial information may, again, contribute to a better understanding 
of how organizations can regain legitimacy.  Finally, while this study was unable to do so, 
understanding how rhetoric can impact financial performance could prove important to 
understanding why some organizations like Bear Stearns fell during the financial crisis 
and how other organizations emerged from the crisis safely within a “too big to fail” 
rhetorical bubble.    
In conclusion, this project studied the intersections of financial public relations, 
image restoration, and legitimacy.  Specifically, this study examined the rhetorical 
strategies used by JPMorgan Chase, Bank of America, and Wells Fargo as these 
organizations worked to repaire organizational legitimacy, trust, and stability following 
the 2008 financial crisis.  The rhetoric disseminated to key stakeholders, shareholders, 
and interested publics via press releases, annual reports, and letters to stakeholders was 
explored in an attempt to recreate the image restoration process each bank underwent.  
Finally, this project contributed to the financial public relations and legitimacy literature 
and identified potential implications for practitioners as JPMorgan Chase, Bank of 
America, and Wells Fargo employed various strategies designed to rebuild stakeholder 
and shareholder trust.  These strategies can be applied to other financial institutions 
facing threats to their legitimacy in the aftermath of the poor conveyance of financial and 
financial risk information.
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Appendix A JPMorgan Chase 
Table A.1: JPMorgan Chase Quarterly Net Income 










despite the credit 
crisis and foreclosure 
reduction efforts 
*“We are helping the 
economy recover.” 
*JPMorgan Chase as 
remaining committed 
to “doing our part to 
help bring stability to 
the communities in 
which we operate and 
to the financial system 
overall.” 














Chase has helped 
homeowners, 
delivered services to 
our community, and 
JPMorgan Chase 
continued to serve 
their customers. 
*Helped communities 
while keeping the 
company healthy and 
vibrant. 









Table A.2: JPMorgan Chase Financials and Reputation 








































Appendix B Bank of America 
Table B.1: Bank of America Quarterly Net Income 
Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 
$4.2 Billion 
$0.20 per share 
$3.2 Billion 
$0.33 per share 
-$1 Billion 
-$0.26 per share 
-$194 Million 
-$0.60 per share 
*$402 million paid to 
the U.S.  government
*Focus on helping 
more than 382,000 
people refinance their 
existing mortgage or 
fund a new mortgage.
*119,000 modified 
home loans to help 
homeowners avoid 
foreclosure.   
*Bank of America 
funded $110.6 billion 
in first mortgages, 
helping nearly 
500,000 purchase a 
home or refinance 
existing mortgages.
*Small Business 
Banking had more 
than $580 million in 
new credit for small 
businesses, helping 
more than 35,000 
customers.    
*Continued focus on 
the number of 
mortgages and re-
financed mortgages.   
*Rate relief or 
modifications to home 
mortgages in 
accordance with the 
government’s Making 
Home Affordable 
program are already 
in effect; 
approximately 98,000 
customers are already 
in a trial period.   
*Continued focus on 
$86.6 billion in 
mortgages made to 
low- and moderate-
income borrowers.   
*Expanded the home 
retention staff to more 
than 15,000 to help 
those experiencing 
difficulty with their 
home loans.   
*Focus on clarity, 
lending to small 
businesses.   







Table B.2: Bank of America Financials and Reputation 








































Appendix C Wells Fargo 
Table C.1: Wells Fargo Quarterly Net Income 
Q1 2009 Q2 2009 Q3 2009 Q4 2009 
$3.05 Billion 
$0.56 per share 
$3.17 Billion 
$0.57 per share 
$3.24 Billion 
$0.56 per share 
$2.8 Billion 
$0.08 per share 
*Quarterly earnings 
were a record high.  
*President and CEO 
John Stumpf: “Our 
talented team has built 
solid momentum for 
2009.  We are open 
for business and we’re 
gaining wallet share 
and market share, as 
we’ve always done in 
economically 
challenging times 
because we make 
fewer mistakes than 
our competitors in the 
so-called ‘good times’ 
*Focused on 
customers as a 
method of gaining 
market share by 
“satisfying all our 
customers’ financial 




*President and CEO 
John Stumpf: “Doing 
what’s right for our 
customers again 
proved to be right for 
our stockholders as 
our talented team 
members earned even 
more of our 
customers’ business, 
enabling us to achieve 
our third consecutive 
quarter of record 
earnings.”  
*Home mortgage 
relief to 1.3 million 
customers so far in 
*Record earnings for 
Wells Fargo are 
attributed to the value 
Wells Fargo created 
in 2009 for the 
customers and 
communities it serves.  
*President and CEO 
John Stumpf: “…we 
believe our franchise 
has never been better 
positioned to meet the 
challenges and 
opportunities ahead of 
it.”  
*Boasts Wells Fargo’s 




Table C.1 Continued 
and have fewer 





competitors, and it 
would do so again 
in 2010.    
 
Source: (Wells Fargo Quarterly Reports, 2009) 
 
Table C.2: Wells Fargo Financials and Reputation 








Source: (Forbes, 2009; Market Watch/Wall Street Journal, 2014) 
 
 
